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ABSTRACT: 
 
This study assesses the relation between foreign aid 
and the contribution of civil society to the consolidation 
of democracy in Romania. Drawing on questionnaire 
data as well as internal documents the study 
specifically looks at the impact of international 
assistance on the participation of advocacy groups in 
the governmental policymaking process. On the one 
hand, it is shown that international assistance enhances 
the capacity of NGOs to mobilize advocacy coalitions 
and this in turn increases the effectiveness of their 
participation in influencing policymaking. But on the 
other hand, democracy assistance programs have a 
rather paradoxical effect by impeding NGOs’ civic 
engagement with their domestic constituencies. Hence, 
international assistance has a mixed impact on the 
contribution of civil society to the consolidation of 
democracy: it fosters advocacy groups’ “link-up” to 
the governmental decision-makers while in the same 
time it hinders their “link-down” to ordinary people.  
 
 
Keywords: democracy assistance, civil society, 
consolidation of democracy, Romania, advocacy 
coalitions, policymaking, free access to information 
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PREFACE 
 
Within the democratization theory, an 
increasingly important role has been attributed to the 
international factors promoting the consolidation of 
democracy. The topic of this book focuses on one 
particular arena of democracy promotion: the civil 
society, with special attention paid to the role of 
external support for the non-governmental (NGO) 
sector in Romania. I find this topic interesting because 
it emphasizes a bottom-up strategy of democracy 
assistance, which I consider particularly relevant for the 
consolidation of the new democratic regimes.    
A significant part of the international support 
for democracy promotion in Central and Eastern 
European countries has been channeled to NGOs with 
the intention of building and strengthening civil society 
as a means for consolidating democracy. Subsequently, 
an extensive NGO sector has emerged in many of these 
states largely due to this influx of external funding. 
However, aiding democracy from abroad remains a 
highly controversial topic that in my view raises some 
puzzling questions: Has external support helped or 
hindered the potentially democratizing role of NGOs in 
these countries? To what extent can international 
funding stimulate civic engagement and participation in 
new democracies? Neither champions nor critics of 
democracy assistance have systematically grounded 
their discussion of these two questions in detailed 
analysis of contemporary efforts for promoting 
democracy.  
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Previous research in the field has revealed an 
ongoing academic debate about the role of international 
factors in promoting civil society and democracy. The 
main claim of the supporters of democracy assistance is 
that civil society represents both the force that can hold 
governments accountable and the base upon which a 
vibrant democratic culture can be built (Carothers and 
Ottaway 2000, p. 4). There follows from this 
assumption that promoting civil society is key to 
democracy building. However, some authors have 
emphasized, that civil society is not “an unmitigated 
blessing for democracy” (Schmitter 1997, pp. 247-248; 
Diamond 1999, pp. 250-261). Moreover, it was claimed 
that besides its empowering effect, international 
assistance could also hinder civil society’s 
democratizing potential by de-linking civic 
organizations from their domestic constituencies and 
making them more accountable to external donors 
(Henderson 2003).  
This book aims to contribute to the academic 
debate on democratization by investigating in a 
balanced and critical manner both the positive and 
negative effects of the international assistance on the 
development of civil society and hence democracy in 
Romania. The book will make a threefold contribution 
to the academic literature on democratization. First, on 
a more general level, it links together three strands of 
an argument that has as yet been insufficiently 
connected: consolidation of democracy, civil society 
and democracy assistance. Re-conceptualizing civil 
society’s participation in policy-making and 
harmonizing the fragmented disciplinary and 
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theoretical directions will reveal the influence of 
international assistance on the consolidation of 
democracy more accurately. Second, the study 
contributes to the academic debate on the impact of 
international assistance on civil society by empirically 
testing the effects of foreign aid in a novel perspective 
focusing not only on the number and structure of 
NGOs, but also on how these organizations perform 
their ideational functions attributed to them by the 
democratic theory. Previous research has evaluated the 
impact of democracy assistance by pointing out the 
amount of funding and the growing number of NGOs 
operating in different countries. In my view, the 
number of NGOs only suggests the potential of civil 
society to contribute to the consolidation of 
democracy and do not reveal how and to what degree 
NGOs actually carry out their democratic functions. 
This book goes beyond this narrow approach and 
shows how NGOs actually function, what are the 
forms and the intensity of their involvement in policy-
making and which are the most effective mechanisms 
of influencing decision-makers. Finally, the book 
provides a case study on the evolution of civil society 
and its contribution to democratization in Romania, 
which adds to the scarce amount of research about this 
country’s associational life. While most of the 
literature on Romania’s civil society focuses on the 
sociological, psychological and economical factors as 
determinants of citizens’ participation and activism, 
this book evaluates the organizational and institutional 
opportunity structures which influence citizens’ 
participation in NGOs on the one hand, and NGOs’ 
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participation in governmental policy-making on the 
other hand. Consequently, the book describes the 
development of NGOs, their relation with 
international donors, and their involvement with 
policy-making under successive post-communist 
Romanian governments before focusing in detail on 
one specific campaign for liberalizing access to public 
information in Romania.         
In order to assess the impact of external 
support on civil society building I use several methods 
and techniques for collecting and analyzing the 
relevant data. First, a comprehensive review of the 
academic literature on civil society and democracy 
promotion provides the direction of the analysis, 
laying the basis for a discussion of the targeted issues. 
Another method of enquiry was the questionnaire, 
which I conducted with NGO leaders who participated 
in the campaign for the adoption and implementation 
of the freedom of information act (Law 544/2001). 
Last but not least, I have carried out a systematic 
content analysis of the primary data collected in the 
form of internal literature (i.e. organisations’ 
newsletters, bulletins, annual reports, journals, 
publications, etc.) from the civic groups analysed here 
in order to obtain additional background information 
on their organisational goals, activities and guiding 
philosophies.   
 This book is based on a research project called 
“Consolidating Democracy by International 
Assistance for Civil Society: The Role of Advocacy 
Coalitions in Liberalizing Access to Public 
Information in Romania” carried out between March-
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May 2005 and which led to the elaboration of my MA 
dissertation presented in June 2005 at the Department 
of Political Science of the Central European University, 
in Budapest, Hungary. The research facilities at CEU 
and especially the well equipped library helped me to 
access the up-to-date literature on democratization, 
civil society and democracy assistance. I could not have 
got this far with this book without the support of my 
CEU professors, to whom I express my gratitude. My 
MA dissertation supervisor, Carol Harrington, 
encouraged me with her continuous trust in the 
feasibility of this project and helped me to complete the 
research. She guided me to fill the gaps in my argument 
and her suggestions during process of writing the 
dissertation were most beneficial. Dorothee Bohle, who 
acted as my dissertation’s second reader and András 
Bozoki encouraged me to propose the topic of this 
research for the MA dissertation. I don’t believe I could 
have done this book without attending the Comparative 
Democratization course of Carsten Schneider in the 
second semester of my studies at CEU. The course 
provided an introduction to the theory of 
democratization which inspired me and many of my 
colleagues to further investigate the determinants 
democratic consolidation in different countries.  
 Before taking the decision to publish this book, 
I have presented the results of my MA dissertation at 
several conferences. The positive feed-back received on 
these occasions helped me to gain confidence in my 
work. In addition, the continuous encouragements from 
my colleagues from the University of Oradea were 
decisive in publishing this book. For this, I am indebted 
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especially to two professors from Oradea, Lia Pop and 
Alexandru Ilieş. Lastly, I would like to extend my 
thanks to all my interviewees for taking time to 
complete my questionnaire.  
        
 
Marius I. Tătar 
Oradea, 10 Sept. 2006 
 
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 After the end of the Cold War a “remarkable 
consensus” has emerged rendering modern liberal 
democracy as the only legitimate political regime in most 
parts of the world. Consequently, democracy promotion 
surged to the top of the neo-liberal agenda and the 
supporters of liberal democracy began to claim that free 
and fair elections were the only entitled basis for 
governmental authority within states. This, in turn, 
justified the idea of external intervention in the internal 
affaires of sovereign countries for democracy promotion 
or protection reasons. Moreover, established democracies 
seemed increasingly to believe that their model of liberal 
democracy provides the institutions, rights and practices 
that are applicable in any part of the world (Schmitter and 
Brouwer, 1999).  
In addition, the supporters of neo-liberal agenda 
saw an organic connection between what they termed 
market economics and development, on the one hand and 
political freedom and democracy, on the other hand 
(Carothers, 1999). Western governments and 
governmental agencies such as USAID, along with 
international organizations such as United Nations (UN), 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank conceived political and economic freedom as 
two mutually reinforcing factors (Paris, 2003). In their 
view market reform policies would strengthen 
democratization in developing countries by increasing 
economic growth, raising socioeconomic levels, 
1
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
empowering individuals and creating new centers of 
power outside governments. Democratization in turn was 
held to support economic development and market 
reforms by increasing government accountability and 
transparency, hindering corruption and promoting the rule 
of law, and fostering citizens’ right and other limits on 
government power (Carothers, 1999). Therefore, 
supporters of the neo-liberal agenda argue that democracy 
and development reinforce each other as do democracy 
and peace1.  However, critics of the neo-liberal agenda 
saw the projects of democracy promotion and their 
implementers in developing countries (i.e. NGOs) as 
“new instruments of control” that foster weak pluralist 
regimes, low tariffs, liberal investment laws, and other 
mechanisms that would permit Western economic 
dominance (Carothers, 1999). 
 Policy makers use different methods to spur 
countries to democracy, but the most common tool is 
democracy assistance that is aid programs explicitly 
designed to bolster democratic institutions, processes and 
principles (Carothers, 1999). However the supporters of 
this neo-liberal agenda of democracy promotion were not 
only Western governments and multilateral organizations 
of a global and regional nature but also a vast range of 
private associations, foundations, and charitable 
                                                          
1 For this argument, see for instance the UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan’s message to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the 
Community of Democracies, delivered by Ernesto Zedillo, former 
President of Mexico and Envoy of the Secretary-General for the 
September 2005 Summit, in Santiago, 28 April. Available online 
at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9846.doc.htm 
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organizations. Most of these organizations have their 
headquarters in established democracies but they work 
with (and in some cases sponsor the creation of) 
counterpart organizations in the recipient countries 
(Schmitter and Brouwer, 1999). Many of these local 
groups cast themselves in terms of civil society 
organizations. 
The idea of “civil society” has achieved 
prominence in political discourse over the past two 
decades, particularly in connection with the so-called 
“third wave” of democratization. In the transformation 
processes which occurred in Central and Eastern Europe 
in the late 1980s and during the 1990s, supporters of 
democracy have seen civil society as an increasingly 
crucial agent for limiting authoritarian government, 
strengthening popular empowerment and enforcing 
political accountability. Subsequently, a significant part of 
the international assistance for democracy in Central and 
Eastern European countries has been channeled to the 
strengthening of civil society as a means for consolidating 
and deepening democracy. As a result, extensive 
networks of externally-funded non-governmental 
organizations (NGO) have gradually developed in this 
region.   
 However, aiding democracy from abroad remains 
a highly controversial topic that poses some puzzling 
questions: What is the impact of foreign aid on civil 
society? Does it foster or rather hinder the democratizing 
potential of civil society organizations? Previous research 
in this field, although scant both in its theoretical and 
empirical aspects, has revealed an ongoing academic 
3
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
debate2 about the role of international factors in 
promoting civil society and democracy. Critics of foreign 
aid to civil society argue that Western donors only fund 
organizations and projects that fit their goals, which 
frequently do not take into account the local needs and 
realities. From this point of view, local partners are seen 
as mere executing agents of the political and economic 
agenda of major donors. Consequently, some authors 
have emphasized that besides its empowering effect, 
international assistance could also hinder civil society’s 
democratizing potential by de-linking civic organizations 
from their domestic constituencies and making them more 
accountable to external donors (Henderson 2003).  
In addition, scholars have argued that international 
funding fosters professionalized elite-dominated NGOs 
that are somewhat removed from the more basic demands 
of a wide segment of society and therefore have a rather 
negative impact on promoting broad political participation 
in the democratic process. Another related point is about 
what Stubbs (1996, p.2) calls “the new globalised middle 
class” that seems to be a key product of the “aid industry” 
and which comprises NGO professionals who regardless 
of their country of origin tend to share a common global 
perspective. These professionalized NGOs are responsive 
to donors’ bureaucratic needs such as producing grant 
proposals (usually in English), budget and accounting 
reports and other project related documents (Carothers 
and Ottaway, 2000, p.12). Therefore, the requirements 
imposed by foreign funding foster the emergence of elite 
groups with English language skills, which work in 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed discussion on this debate see Chapter 1, 
Section 3. 
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NGOs that are not open to ordinary people or in touch 
with their needs.  
Another related point regarding the constraints 
imposed by international aid refers to the donors’ focus on 
projects that fit their priorities rather than sustaining the 
development of organizations. According to Petrescu 
(2000, p. 235), with a few exceptions, grants are usually 
large enough only to sustain a project, not to build up an 
organization so that it can stand on its own. Indeed, this 
constant work of NGOs on writing grant proposals might 
divert their attention from developing the organization 
and building up a constituency. 
In addition, scholars argue that such elitist civil 
society organizations are not representative organizations 
so that they can only speak on behalf of the people, but 
not for them (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000, p.16). 
Moreover, some authors assert that NGOs may voice the 
interest of people in policy-making but they lack any form 
of accountability to the citizenry. Consequently, critics 
have raised the issue whether the attempt to influence 
legislation by non-representative advocacy organizations 
is really democratic or is simply an imitation of a 
questionable U.S. practice that gives special interest 
groups the possibility of exercising inordinate influence 
(Petrescu, 2000).  
By contrast, the main claim of the supporters of 
democracy assistance is that civil society represents both a 
force that can hold governments accountable and the base 
upon which a vibrant democratic culture can be built 
(Carothers and Ottaway 2000, p. 4). Such arguments are 
based on a series of assumptions about the positive impact 
of external funding on the potential contribution of civil 
5
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
society to democratization. According to White (1994, 
379) these can be boiled down to several assertions. First, 
civil society serves an important advocacy role in 
promoting necessary state reforms to enhance the 
consolidation of democracy. Second, civil society 
organizations (CSOs) help to broaden participation by 
including in the political processes previously 
marginalized groups such as women, ethnic minorities, 
etc. Third, by bringing people together in cooperative 
ventures, CSOs teach civic values such as compromise, 
cooperation, and trust (White, 1994). There follows from 
these assumption that promoting civil society is the key to 
consolidating democracy.  
This book brings together three strands of an 
argument that has as yet been insufficiently connected: 
the relationship between democracy assistance, civil 
society and consolidation of democracy. Previous 
literature on the role of civil society in democratization 
processes has focused mainly on the demise of autocratic 
regimes and the transition to democracy (Ekiert & Kubik, 
2001). However, there is a significant lack of theoretical 
and empirical studies on the contribution of civil societies 
to the consolidation of the new democracies (Merkel, 
2001 p.96). In addition, research analyzing the impact of 
international factors on the civil society has tended to 
focus more on the way in which external funding affects 
the structure of the NGO sector and not on how these 
organizations perform their ideational functions attributed 
to them by democratic theory.  
Therefore, this research aims to bridge a gap in 
the existing literature by analyzing the influence of 
international assistance on the participation of civil 
6
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
society in the policymaking processes in newly 
consolidating democracies. A consolidated democracy 
requires not only voters’ participation in elections, but 
also necessarily implies a sustained effort of organized 
groups to influence government decision and increase 
their role in policymaking. Moreover, this study argues 
that citizens’ participation in policy-making through civil 
society organizations is sine qua non for democratic 
consolidation. Therefore, I examine participation as a two 
step process: first citizens’ participation in civil society 
organizations through internal democratic decision 
making; second civil society organizations’ participation 
in governmental policymaking representing the interest of 
their constituencies. Consequently, civil society serves as 
a link between citizens and government, crystallizes the 
will of the community and advocates it on the 
governmental level in order to advance the common good. 
Having made these explanations, I will proceed by 
presenting the main argument of this book:  
This study evaluates the relation between foreign 
aid and the contribution of civil society to the 
consolidation of democracy in Romania. More 
specifically, the study will analyze the impact of 
international assistance on the participation of advocacy 
groups in the governmental policymaking process. On the 
one hand, it will be shown that international assistance 
enhances the capacity of NGOs to mobilize advocacy 
coalitions and this in turn increases the effectiveness of 
their participation in influencing policymaking. But on the 
other hand, democracy assistance programs have a 
rather paradoxical effect by impeding NGOs’ civic 
engagement with their domestic constituencies. Hence, 
7
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
international assistance has a mixed impact on the 
contribution of civil society to the consolidation of 
democracy: it fosters advocacy groups’ “link-up” to the 
governmental decision-makers while in the same time it 
hinders their “link-down” to ordinary people.  
 In order to investigate this topic, I analyze the 
advocacy campaign for introducing the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) in Romania in 2001. Moreover 
the study will further examine the role of civil society in 
monitoring and participating in the implementation of this 
piece of legislation. I base the analysis on evidence 
collected through questionnaires that were distributed by 
e-mail to the advocacy groups which participated in the 
campaign for liberalizing the access to public information 
in Romania3. In addition, an analysis of the documents 
published by the involved actors has been carried out, 
along with a study of articles published in newspapers.   
 In chapter one of the book I will discuss a 
theoretical framework for the relationship between 
international assistance and the contribution of civil 
society to the consolidation of democracy. In addition, I 
will elaborate more on the concepts used to test my 
hypothesis. After having presented my main theoretical 
arguments, in chapter two I will analyze the emergence of 
the civil society in post-communist Romania with a 
particular emphasis on the development of advocacy 
groups and the role of international assistance in this 
process. Chapter three will present the Romanian 
institutional setup regarding policy making as well as the 
evolution of the civil society’s participation in policy 
                                                          
3 For more methodological details, as well as case selection, see 
Chapter four, Section one, of the book. 
8
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
design and implementation. In chapter four I will analyze 
the impact of international assistance on the main civil 
society actors of the advocacy coalition that initiated the 
campaign for the adoption of FOIA in Romania. More 
specifically, the discussion will concentrate on their 
source of funding, level of organization, connections with 
domestic and international actors, and type of advocacy 
methods. In chapter five, I will examine the strategy of 
advocacy NGOs and the mechanisms, which led to the 
adoption of FOIA. Subsequently, a discussion on the role 
of civil society in monitoring the implementation of this 
act will follow. In the conclusion I will summarize and 
interpret the main findings. Finally, I will draw broader 
conclusions from the Romania case and present 
constructive recommendations for enhancing the 
participation of citizens in decision-making.      
9
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
1. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY, CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Within the democratization theory, an increasingly 
important role has been attributed to the international 
factors in promoting the consolidation of democracy. The 
topic of this book focuses on one particular arena of 
democracy promotion: the civil society, with special 
attention paid to the role of external support for the 
advocacy NGO sector in the policymaking process in 
Romania. I find this topic interesting because it 
emphasizes a bottom up strategy of democracy assistance, 
which I consider particularly relevant for the 
consolidation of the new democratic regimes. In this 
chapter I review three interrelated sets of relevant 
literature. First, I will present an overview of different 
theoretical approaches revealed by the democratization 
literature. Then I will narrow down the scope of this 
chapter to one particular arena of democratization, namely 
civil society’s role in consolidating democracy. Finally, I 
will concentrate on the academic debate regarding the 
impact of international assistance on the NGO sector in 
new democracies.  
 
1.1 Democratization theory 
 
 Democratization processes have been frequently 
divided for analytical purposes into distinct phases such as 
liberalization, transition, and consolidation (Schneider and 
Schmitter, 2004). Consequently, scholars of 
democratization have focused on various sets of research 
10
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
questions and thus have used various approaches to 
analyze these stages. In general, transition and 
consolidation of democracy are seen as two qualitatively 
different components of the overall process of 
democratization. Therefore, previous literature has 
emphasized an epistemological distinction between 
transition and consolidation theories: while the study of 
transition is concerned mainly with the regime change, 
the study of consolidation focuses on regime persistency. 
As Karl and Schmitter (2002, pp. 8-9) have pointed out, 
transitions are periods of “abnormal politics” 
characterized by “extraordinary uncertainty, where 
actions are under-determined and choices under-
specified.” By contrast, consolidation represents a return 
to “normal” politics in which the outcomes/choices of the 
transition are transformed into institutions, i.e. “into 
relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced 
and normatively accepted” by the subjects of such 
institutions (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004, p. 4). 
However, transition and consolidation do not necessarily 
succeed in a linear and deterministic way and therefore 
democratization should be conceived as an open-ended 
process. 
In order to assess the success or failure of 
democratization a working definition of democracy is 
needed. Much of the earlier work on transitions was based 
on a minimalist definition such as that of Joseph 
Schumpeter (1976), or on the broader variant proposed by 
Robert Dahl (1989). However, recent research has 
attempted to incorporate in the definition of democracy 
more complex elements such as legitimacy (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, Diamond 1999) or societal participation 
11
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
(Grugel 2002). Although these more elaborate definitions 
are often difficult to operationalize, they reflect the 
necessity to consider more than purely formal criteria, 
which may be adequate for the transition stage, but do not 
reflect the societal penetration of democratic habits and 
values necessary for the successful consolidation of 
democracy (Egbert and Stewart 2003, p.2). 
The way in which one defines democracy has 
important implications for the meaning of democratic 
consolidation. In contrast with the supporters of the 
minimal definition of democracy, in this book I refer to 
the concept of democracy as a continuous process that 
implies not only a set of formal rules, procedures and 
institutions but also substantive rights. According to this 
“substantive” approach, “democracy [is] a process that 
has to be continually reproduced, a mode of regulating 
power relations in such a way as to maximize the 
opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in 
which they live, to participate in and influence debates 
about the key decisions which affect society” (Kaldor and 
Vejvoda, 1997, p.67). Consequently, the consolidation of 
democracy as a process means more than the mere 
adoption of electoral procedures for changing the 
government peacefully. It also requires democratic 
institutions that enjoy popular legitimacy and create the 
framework which allows free political participation, 
accountability, and a practice of rights, tolerance and 
pluralism (Grugel, 2002, p.7). Therefore, my study 
emphasizes democratic consolidation as a process, and 
introduces civil society’s participation in policy-making 
as a sine qua non to increase the quality of democracies 
under consolidation. 
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However, consolidation of democracy appears to 
remain one of the most controversial and ambiguous 
concepts in comparative politics. Originally the term was 
used to examine the prospects of democratic survival and 
the avoidance of authoritarian regression. This is what 
Schedler calls the “negative” notion of consolidation of 
democracy (1998, p. 103). In contrast, some scholars have 
been increasingly concerned with analyzing the means to 
attain progress toward an improved quality democracy. 
This latter approach involves the “positive” task of 
deepening and completing democracy (Schedler, 2001, 
p.67). However, Schedler (1998 and 2001) argues that by 
a restoration of the initial “negative” notion of 
consolidation, concerned only with the prospects of 
democratic survival, scholars might achieve more 
conceptual clarity. I find this claim misleading since it 
excludes the important “positive” connotation of 
consolidation that refers to the advancement toward a 
more democratic regime. Contrary to Schedler’s 
argument, this research adopts a broader concept of 
consolidation, one that accepts the positive tasks of 
consolidation not only as a means for deepening and 
developing democracy toward higher quality standards, 
but also as a good strategy to move democracy away from 
the prospects of democratic erosion and authoritarian 
regression. Therefore, this book does not use a 
“defensive” concept of consolidation, but rather an 
“offensive” one, according to which consolidation 
represents a continuous process of deepening democracy 
by increasing the participatory quality of a regime. 
To these conceptual arguments favoring a 
“positive” notion for the consolidation of democracy I 
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would like to add some empirical considerations. Taking 
into account that this research represents a case study of 
Romania with some references to other countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, I find the positive approach 
of consolidation more analytically productive. This 
argument is based on the empirical observation that in 
many countries in this region (i.e. new EU members and 
candidate states) issues of democratic quality (positive 
consolidation) have tended to become more salient both in 
everyday politics and on researchers’ agendas than issues 
of democratic survival (negative consolidation). 
The empirical argument presented above, shows 
that often democratization processes should be understood 
in their proper historical and geographical context. In this 
sense, much of the democratization research accepts 
Samuel Huntington's thesis4 that democratization has 
historically occurred in "waves", or groups "of transitions 
from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur 
within a specified period of time and that significantly 
outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that 
period of time" (Huntington 1991, p.15). According to 
this theory, the third5 “wave” of democratization began 
with Portugal in 1974 and continued in Southern Europe, 
                                                          
4 However, the definition of democracy adopted in this book is 
broader then Huntington’s (1991, 7) electoral definition according 
to which a political system is “democratic, to the extent that its 
most powerful collective decision makers were selected through 
fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes.” 
5 The first and longest democratizing wave stretched from the end 
of the nineteenth century to the 1930s, the second began in 1945 
and encompassed most of Western Europe, Japan, and parts of the 
developing world. 
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Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet republics, and then spread all over the 
developing world.  
Despite its limitations6, the “wave” model is 
useful for situating democratization in its global and 
regional context. There have been increasing efforts to 
compare developments across various waves or in 
different geographical regions within a given wave 
(Grugel 2002; Linz and Stepan 1996). Intensive 
examination of the developments in the third wave has 
resulted in the crystallization of a research agenda around 
the question of differing trajectories. Why, it is asked, are 
some states relatively successful in making the transition 
to an increasingly consolidated democracy, while others 
have achieved only an incomplete transition or even 
appear to be sliding back into authoritarianism (Egbert 
and Stewart 2003, p.3). 
One important factor which has been suggested to 
explain differing trajectories in Central and Eastern 
Europe is the impact of the international environment, 
which is widely acknowledged to play large role in this 
region (Pridham 1997; Schmitter 1999; Whitehead 1999). 
Laurence Whitehead (1999) proposes three increasingly 
complex types of international influence - contagion, 
control and consent - while Philippe Schmitter (1999) 
suggests the addition of a fourth, conditionality. For 
instance, the literature on EU enlargement has dealt 
extensively with the effects of EU conditionality on 
developments in the applicant countries (Grabbe 1998; 
                                                          
6 For instance Grugel (2002, p.45) has criticized this model as 
telling little about how democracy actually comes about in national 
societies.  
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Schimmelfennig 2002), but democratization studies have 
been slow to incorporate the insights from EU scholars 
(Egbert and Stewart 2003, p.3). 
Moreover, the EU enlargement literature has 
focused almost exclusively on the level of political elites, 
as it is there that conditionality has had a direct impact. As 
a result, the role of civil society in developing democracy 
has been neglected in previous empirical studies (Jahn 
and Stewart 2003, p.3), despite its theoretically 
established connection to democratization processes (Linz 
and Stepan 1996). However, my study aims to contribute 
to the democratization literature by connecting the role of 
civil society and international factors in promoting 
democracy. I believe that the civil society realm is an 
excellent field for the investigation of international 
influence on democratization, as external actors have been 
active throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 
supporting civil organizations initiatives as a means for 
strengthening and deepening democracy. 
 
1.2 The role of civil society in consolidating 
democracy 
 
Civil society is a term with a long history in social 
sciences and it has a wide range of competing and 
sometimes even contradictory meanings (Forbrig, 2003). 
It is beyond the purposes of this book to cover the whole 
conceptual history of this term. Therefore I will only 
briefly discuss a working definition that is appropriate for 
the goals of the research and which is also widely shared 
among scholars of civil society. According to Schmitter 
(1997, p. 240) “civil society - can be defined as a set or 
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system of self organized groups that: 1) are relatively 
independent of both public authorities and private units of 
production and reproduction, that is of firms and families; 
2) are capable of deliberating about and taking collective 
actions in defense or promotion of their interests and 
passions; 3) do not seek to replace either state agents or 
private (re)producers or to accept responsibility for 
governing the polity as a whole; and 4) agree to act within 
pre-established rules of a ‘civil’ nature, that is conveying 
mutual respect.” Therefore, civil society refers to actions 
into the public sphere and rests on four behavioral norms: 
dual autonomy (from both state and private spheres), 
collective action, non-usurpation (does not want to take 
state offices nor to replace private agents) and civility 
(based on respect for others). 
 Taking into account the definition presented 
above, civil society still could be understood as a broad 
concept, encompassing a wide range of organizations and 
associations that exist outside of the state (including 
political parties), the market and the family. 
Consequently, the understanding of civil society should 
be narrowed down to a notion that better serves the 
purposes of this research. There is a considerable debate 
in the field of international assistance to civil society, 
about whether civil society organizations focusing on 
economic development and social issues make as much a 
contribution to democracy as those that focus specifically 
on democracy promotion (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000).  
According to some authors (see especially 
Putnam, 1993) all voluntary forms of associations 
promote participation, trust and thus empowerment, and 
this is the basis on which democracy can be build. I do  
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not reject the argument that all activities that entail citizen 
participation help build social capital and thus have an 
indirect impact on democracy. However, this book aims 
to assess the impact of international assistance on civil 
society’s participation in policy-making. Therefore, 
following Carothers and Ottaway (2000), I find it more 
useful to analytically differentiate between those NGOs 
which donors treat as being directly engaged in 
democracy work and those organizations that donors 
consider to be contributing only indirectly to 
democratization. As a result, this book concentrates on 
NGOs that pursue policy advocacy for the production of 
public goods that cannot be exclusively appropriated by 
their members7. 
Being aware of the ongoing academic debate and 
the multiplicity of meanings assigned to the term, I will 
refer to the concept of civil society to mean public interest 
advocacy organizations outside the control of the state that 
seek to influence it on behalf of public aims. In this sense 
of the term, civil society organizations are essential to the 
consolidation of democracy as they can serve both as 
advocates of the public good and watchdogs of political 
power. Consequently, this book asserts that the capacity of 
civil society organizations to press for democratic reforms 
and to engage with the state is perhaps key for 
understanding whether democratic consolidation takes 
place (Grugel, 2002). However, the mere existence of such 
                                                          
7 This book will not focus on trade unions, although these 
organizations also participate in the policy-making process. 
However, typically unions do not act as public interest advocacy 
groups, but rather interest groups, usually advocating only the 
interest of their members.  
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organizations does not necessarily reflect the strength of 
civil society. It merely points to its potential (Mendelson & 
Glenn, 2002). Therefore, I will look closely how advocacy 
NGOs actually function and how they influence policy-
making. 
Scholars of political participation in 
democratizing regimes have tended to focus on voting or 
collective action (and protest) as the only means of 
expressing the societal interest in the state-society 
connection. However, this approach neglects an 
increasingly important model of how societal interests are 
articulated communicated, and recognized in democratic 
regimes that is the policymaking processes. “The ability of 
citizens or groups to participate in, communicate ideas to, 
and gain influence over policymaking strengthens 
democracy; the inability to do so could lead to such 
significant destabilizing pathologies in political 
development as apathy, extremism, and extra-institutional 
means of political expression. The key to democratic 
development is in the quality of the state-society 
connection, which is generally perceived to extend beyond 
the act of voting” (Green, 1999, pp.2-3).  
Civil society’s participation in decision-making 
contributes to the consolidation of democracy by 
increasing the accountability, responsiveness and 
legitimacy of the regime. Although elections are the main 
form of political participation, in the unsettled political 
environment of democratizing countries, voting might 
prove to be an inefficient tool of popular control over the 
government (O’Donnell, 1999a, pp. 30-31)8. In these 
                                                          
8 In addition, O’Donnell, (1999b) identifies two forms of 
accountability horizontal and vertical. While horizontal 
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contexts, effective popular control may require, besides 
elections, the continuous accountability of government to 
the citizens by the participation of civil society in the 
policy making process (Beetham 1994, 29). Therefore, in 
new democracies civil society should act as ombudsmen 
or auditors on behalf of the citizens. As a result, this book 
asserts that an active civil society essentially contributes 
to the accountability procedures in democratizing regimes 
and thus is key to democratic consolidation.     
Besides increased accountability, participation of 
the citizenry in the democratic process through civil 
society can also improve the responsiveness of the 
government. Civil society is considered to function as a 
two-way channel between the citizens and the state 
(Carothers, 1996, p. 65). On the one hand, it serves to 
mobilize, articulate and represent the interest of citizens in 
influencing decisions at the governmental level. On the 
other hand, it transmits governmental decisions to the 
public and helps to implement them. In the policy design 
and/or implementation process, civil society can also 
provide the government with expertise and information 
resources otherwise unavailable. Therefore, a vigorous, 
pluralistic civil society strengthens a democracy by 
increasing the government’s responsiveness to those it 
claims to represent. The notion of civil society 
participation in policy-making emphasized in this book is 
different from more traditional analytical categories such 
                                                                                                            
accountability refers to the existence of different state institutions 
that oversee each other, the vertical accountability points to the 
citizens control over the state through elections on the one hand, 
and by participating in the policy-making process through civil 
society organizations, on the other. 
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as clientelism or corporatism. This paper argues that civil 
society contributes to the consolidation of democracy 
when it participates in decision making processes as an 
equal partner with the state, in a relationship based on 
mutual respect in which both the state and the civil society 
are strong and accept the other as a legitimate partner. 
Moreover, this relationship should not be based only on 
in-formal mechanisms9 but rather on institutional 
arrangements that create spaces for civil society to 
participate (i.e. consultative councils, committees that 
monitor governmental policies, participatory budgeting, 
etc.)    
Last but not least, civil society’s participation in 
policy contributes to the consolidation of democracy, as it 
renders the governmental decision-making process more 
open and legitimate. Policy deliberation through civil 
society organizations creates relationships and offers the 
possibility of dialogue between the governments and the 
citizenry. The more often that actors have the opportunity 
to develop the organizational and political capacity to 
advance their goals, protect their interests, and preserve 
their values in the democratic institutional environment, 
the more secure their commitment will be to that 
environment (Valenzuela 1992).  
While citizens’ participation through civil society 
is widely believed to have a positive contribution to 
                                                          
9 Before 2003, when a law on decisional transparency was adopted 
in Romania, civil society had mainly informal possibilities to 
participate in policy-making. These included: direct contact with 
elected officials, writing letters of complaint, articles in the 
national and local newspapers, etc. but these were rarely used 
because of the lack of organizational capacity and lack of tradition 
with participatory democracy (Barna, 1996). 
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democratic consolidation, the possible mechanisms of this 
popular participation in democratizing societies have been 
poorly studied due to the focus of much of the transition 
literature on elites. An exception is the work of Wolfgang 
Merkel (2001), who attempts to characterize the role of 
civil society according to different stages of the 
democratization process and concludes that in the 
consolidation phase the role of civil society is likely to 
become more problematic. From the perspective of 
mobilization, Merkel claims that civil society faces an 
enormous decline after the successful institutionalization 
of democracy in East-Central Europe, as the existence of 
the new democratic institutions channeled the 
involvement of citizens in political forms of participation 
through political parties and voting. A somewhat similar 
point regarding participation is made by Marc Morje 
Howard (2003) who argues that after the transition, a 
tremendous disappointment with the developments since 
the collapse of communism have left most post-
communist citizens with a lasting aversion to public 
activities. According to Howard, the legacies of 
mandatory participation in state-controlled organizations 
and the development and persistence of vibrant private 
networks, which diverted attention from public issues, 
have also contributed to a low participation in civil 
society organizations.  
Despite several exceptions, previous literature on 
the role of civil society in the democratization of Central 
and Eastern European countries was preoccupied 
primarily with social movements in early transition stages 
(Jahn and Stewart 2003, p.4). More recently, scholars of 
democratization focused on understanding voter apathy 
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and the lack of broad citizen involvement in protest 
actions (Ekiert and Kubik 2001). Only a small body of 
research on the role of NGOs in developing and/or 
democratizing countries has recently begun to combine 
democratization approaches with an emphasis on the role 
of international actors (Jahn and Stewart 2003, p.4). 
Following an initial period of euphoria, much of the 
literature has been pointing out difficulties faced by the 
NGO sector, such as its over-dependence on Western 
funding, distance from the broader society and 
concentration in major cities (Kaldor 2000; Mendelson 
and Glenn 2002). Few comparative studies on the role of 
NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe have been 
conducted, and those that have taken place have focused 
more on generating practical recommendations than on 
relating developments to consolidation of democracy or 
other realms of theory (for an exception see Mendelson 
and Glenn 2002).  
 
1.3 The debate: positive vs. negative impact of 
international assistance for civil society 
 
As already mentioned in the introduction of this 
book, democracy assistance to civil society flourished 
during the 1990s as an instrument of promoting what has 
been called the neo-liberal agenda. This new international 
policy agenda is based on the “consensus” that emerged at 
the end of the Cold War, according to which democracy is 
seen as the only legitimate political regime. Without 
aiming reiterate the arguments presented in the 
introduction, this section further elaborates the ongoing 
debate regarding the impact of democracy assistance on 
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the contribution of civil society to democratic 
consolidation. But, before discussing the potentially 
positive and negative effects of foreign aid, I will briefly 
conceptualize democracy assistance. 
Democracy assistance is a subset of activities of 
what has been labeled as the international context or the 
international dimension of democratization, that is all the 
external actors and factors that affect the political regime 
in a specific country (Schmitter and Brouwer, 1999). The 
tools of foreign actors aiming to promote democracy 
abroad range from mild moral persuasion to outright 
military force. In the middle of that range lie assistance 
programs that aim to support democratic development, 
including programs to reform judiciaries, draft 
constitutions, strengthen parliaments, fortify local 
government, build human rights organizations, support 
independent media, monitor elections, and improve civic 
education (Carothers, 1996).  
The examples mentioned above emphasize the 
high diversity of democracy assistance. Consequently, 
assistance for democratic consolidation consists of all 
overt, consensual and voluntary programs and projects 
that are supported by private or public foreign actors and 
explicitly designed and implemented to contribute to the 
consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries 
(Schmitter and Brouwer, 1999). This definition excludes a 
series of activities which although might influence 
democratic consolidation, are qualitatively different in 
their intention and/or origin. Among these actions 
excluded, Schmitter and Brouwer (1999) mention: covert 
secret diplomacy or secret services; indirect activities e.g. 
literacy campaigns, improving population’s health, 
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generic form of propaganda or promoting economic 
development; activities adopted, supported and 
implemented exclusively by domestic actors; factors of 
international context “without agency” that could 
positively influence democratization, i.e. all forms of 
imitation, contagion, etc.; non-consensual activities 
imposed by foreign actors such as coercion (military 
intervention and occupation) and conditionality 
(sanction/rewards).  
Democracy assistance includes various activities 
targeted at different levels: individual citizens, civil 
society, political society, and the state. According to 
Schmitter and Brouwer (1999), individual citizens are 
usually exposed to democracy programs aiming to 
provide civic education, and thus changing their values 
and eventually their behavior. Civil society organizations 
are often targeted in order to improve their capacity to 
influence policy-making processes and promote citizens’ 
participation. Political society organizations –particularly 
parties-aim usually at general political change. State 
institutions are subject to programs of reform in order to 
create, among other things, more accountable and 
transparent public authorities. Carothers (1996 and 1999) 
distinguishes between two different approaches of 
democracy assistance: the top down approach, targeted 
usually on state institutions, and the bottom up approach, 
focusing on non-state actors. International assistance for 
civil society is part of the second approach, and it is 
expected to have an increased effect on the consolidation 
of newly established democracies (Schmitter and 
Brouwer, 1999).      
International assistance to civil society has 
25
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
become a central and much debated focus of democracy 
development. Within this sector, donor strategies and 
emphases vary, from supporting initiatives to strengthen 
the advocacy roles of individual organizations, to 
supporting groups that promote civic education and 
values. For instance, USAID tends to take a more 
instrumentalist approach, focusing within the broader 
category of civil society on civic advocacy groups as a 
means to promote and consolidate specific democratic 
reforms. Other donors, such as the OECD or the EU, tend 
to focus on human rights organizations more generally 
(Sabatini, 2002, p.8). 
A significant part of the international support for 
democracy promotion in Central and Eastern European 
countries has been channeled to advocacy NGOs. 
Subsequently, an extensive advocacy NGO sector has 
emerged in many of these states largely due to this influx 
of external funding. Aid-providers hope that such groups 
will increase citizens’ participation in public affairs, while 
being themselves models of democratic methods and 
values (Carothers, 1999, p.211). In addition, civil society 
is seen as a means to “make demands on the state and 
hold state officials accountable” (Diamond, 1994, p.5). 
Advocacy groups are also supposed to provide an impetus 
for better government performance, pushing specific 
reform ideas, and supplying the government with 
technical advice and help on designing and implementing 
particular policies (Carothers, 1999, p. 211). More 
generally, civil society has been understood as an engine 
for increasing the participation of the citizens and 
promoting social change (Sabatini, 2002, p.8).  
Another reason for aiding advocacy groups is 
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their potential capacity to stimulate public participation 
yet channel it around discrete issues, such as 
anticorruption or human rights, that are not necessarily 
linked to any one partisan ideology. Moreover, according 
to Carothers (1999, 212) donors seem to favor advocacy 
groups due to their presumed nonpartisanship, 
technocratic knowledge rather than propaganda, that seek 
dialog rather than confrontation, and are typically staffed 
by young, Western-oriented professionals rather than 
older well entrenched personnel of the political parties 
and unions.    
For the purposes of this paper I will employ 
Carothers’ definition of international aid for advocacy 
NGOs, which emphasizes two main forms of assistance 
(1999, p.213). The first is technical assistance – 
comprising training, advice, and information about 
organizational development and management, advocacy 
methods, fund raising, issue analysis, and media relations. 
The second form of support is funding by direct grants for 
projects and programs, including the provision of 
equipment, particularly computers, fax machines, and 
photocopies. Other aid methods are also pursued, 
consisting in training for NGO coalition building in order 
to tackle particular issues with a broad front. In the next 
chapters of the book I will elaborate more on how the 
skills and resources acquired by Romanian civil society 
organizations empowered them to become more 
professionalized and relatively autonomous10 
                                                          
10 By relatively autonomous CSO, I mean an organization that is 
“likely to have more space to act independently and define its own 
agenda”. In this sense, I agree with Diamond’s argument, that 
NGOs are more autonomous when their “financial dependence is 
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organizations. This in turn enabled them to play an 
increasingly important role in the policy-making 
processes. 
However, aiding democracy from abroad remains 
a highly controversial topic that in my view poses some 
puzzling questions: Has external support helped or 
hindered the potentially democratizing role of the NGOs 
in these countries? To what extent can international 
funding stimulate civic engagement and participation in 
the new democracies? My aim is to contribute to the 
previous literature on democracy assistance by a 
systematically grounded discussion of these questions in 
detailed analysis of contemporary efforts for promoting 
democracy in Romania.  
Quite apart from the specific democratic 
improvements that civil society can achieve, donors who 
seek to promote democracy, often see civil society as an 
end in itself (Carothers and Ottaway 2000). Generally 
speaking, donors (especially from the US) define civil 
society as: “an associational realm between state and 
family populated by organizations, which are separate 
from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and 
are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect 
or extend their interests or values” (White 1994:379).  
Increasingly, however, critics are beginning to 
question the extent to which donor-supported 
organizations really fulfil their democratic functions 
                                                                                                            
on foreign donors rather then their own government, especially 
when that international dependence is dispersed among a number 
of donors (public and private) from many countries. In that case, 
no established democracy or donor organization is in a position to 
dictate an agenda, and the loss of one large grant does not threaten 
the survival of the organization” (1999, p. 257). 
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(Sabatini, 2002, 8). Some authors contend that 
international assistance has tended to focus on elite-
dominated groups with limited support in society and 
weak or nonexistent internal democratic mechanisms for 
making decisions (Carothers, 1999). Another similar 
criticism is that many of the CSOs that donors support in 
the name of democracy are themselves not internally 
democratic (Sabatini, 2002, p.9). Despite their stated 
intentions, many such groups have failed to establish 
participatory mechanisms for internal debate and 
decision-making (Edwards and Hulme 1996a).  
Noting that most of the donor-supported civil 
society groups depend on international support, scholars 
such as Edwards and Hulme (1996a) have contended that 
the availability of foreign funding has fostered 
“opportunistic NGOs”. These organizations were formed 
with the primary function of seeking out external financial 
support or adjust their programs and organization to the 
interests of donors (Edwards and Hulme 1996a). As a 
result, critics have argued that organizations remained 
shallow, and dependent on the ideas, contacts and vision 
of one leader or a small number of leaders, and alternative 
leadership is limited. This in turn raises concerns about 
the capacity of the organization to exist beyond its 
funding leader (Sabatini, 2002, p.9).  
Moreover, Edwards and Hulme (1996b) argue 
that there is an inherent tension between the constituency 
of an NGO, which they imply should be the poor and its 
relationship with international donors. In these cases, the 
conditions placed on assistance - reporting, organizational 
development, and the need to recruit English-speaking 
leaders who can seek out foreign contacts - can distract 
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NGOs from their original mission and their primary 
constituency. The risk is that groups become more 
accountable to international donors, what Edwards and 
Hulme term “upward accountability”, rather than to their 
base, or what they term “downward accountability” 
(1996b). 
In addition, Henderson (2003), drawing on a study 
of Russian NGOs argues that among externally funded 
civic groups few were engaging in activities that one 
might associate with “civicness.” Rather than building 
networks and developing publics, groups consciously 
retained small memberships, hoarded information, and 
engaged in uncooperative and even competitive behavior 
with other civic groups. In short, NGOs pursued 
individual, short-term gains rather than collective, long-
term development.  
Moreover, Henderson argues that a fairly distinct 
professionalized English speaking elite had developed 
within NGOs that are rather detached from the broader 
civil society community. In addition, rather than 
facilitating horizontal networks among groups, the harsh 
competition for foreign funds strengthened the division of 
the civic community between the “haves” and the “have-
nots” and centralized resources in the hands of the NGOs 
that had connections with the West. This further 
exacerbated already significant differences in civic 
development between Russia’s centers and the regions. 
Funding created opportunities for some while hindering 
others. Henderson concludes that ironically, although aid 
has been crucial in expanding NGOs’ capacity, it has 
discouraged groups from functioning as a civil society. 
Other authors have pointed out that foreign aid to 
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civil society represents a new form of imperialism. 
According to these authors, NGOs have been accused by 
some critics of “being new instruments of control, 
domesticated by the neoliberal project” (Townsend, 
Porter, and Mawdsley, 2004). Moreover, scholars have 
noticed that internationally funded development NGOs 
are increasingly seen as executing agents of an externally 
imposed political and economic agenda.    
The issue of nonpartisanship among externally 
funded advocacy NGOs is also widely discussed. 
Carothers (1999, pp. 221-222) argues that donors often 
unrealistically discourage organizations from being 
partisan, that is working to advance any particular 
political camp. He terms this nonpartisanship an illusion 
since similar advocacy groups in the USA are often 
partisan (Carothers 1999). In addition, Carothers criticizes 
the nonpartisanship required by donors, since many 
advocacy NGOs often need good connections with parties 
in order to promote successfully their policy proposals. 
However, more research is needed in order to evaluate the 
optimal relationship between parties and civil society 
during the consolidation of democracy phase. Usually 
scholars have tended to study political parties and civil 
society as two separate fields (Sabatini, 2002, p.9).  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have introduced the theoretical 
framework that links together three interrelated research 
areas: consolidation of democracy, civil society and 
democracy assistance. I have argued that citizens’ 
participation in the policy-making through civil society 
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organizations is key to democratic consolidation as it 
increases the accountability, responsiveness and 
legitimacy of government’s decisions. In this sense, 
international donors have supported civil society as a 
means to strengthen the consolidation of democracy in the 
context of what is called the neo-liberal international 
agenda. Nevertheless promoting democracy from abroad 
remains a controversial topic and previous literature on 
democracy assistance to civil society has revealed an 
ongoing debate on the positive versus negative effects of 
foreign aid. 
However, the debate on international assistance to 
civil society usually is based on single sets of 
observations, and lacks a systematically grounded 
discussion based on solid empirical evidence. This 
research will contribute to this academic debate by 
investigating in a balanced and critical manner both the 
positive and negative effects of the international 
assistance on the development of civil society and hence 
democracy. To that end, the next chapters will apply the 
theoretical framework outlined above to the case of 
Romania.   
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2. THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN POST-
COMMUNIST ROMANIA 
  
After having argued that civil society’s participation in 
policy-making is key to democratic consolidation, I will 
go on to demonstrate that in post-communist Romania the 
legacies of communist past inhibited the development of 
civil society organizations. Under these circumstances, an 
important part of the new NGO sector emerged due to the 
support of international assistance. As will be shown, this 
has had important implications for the subsequent 
evolution of civil society in Romania and its relation with 
the government. The chapter begins with a presentation of 
the communist and post communist environment in which 
Romanian NGOs operate. In the second section of the 
chapter I go on to discuss the role of foreign donor in 
developing civil society in Romania. 
 
 
2.1 The legacies of communism and the re-birth 
of civil society in post-communist Romania 
 
 Unlike other countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Romania faced the political changes of 1989 with 
an almost nonexistent civil society. Prior to 1990, 
Romania suffered for decades under one of the most 
repressive communist regimes, that of Nicolae Ceausescu. 
During this period, the communist regime has pursued 
social engineering policies aimed to control all 
organizations and civic movements. Under these 
conditions, the communist regime fully dominated groups 
and organizations to the extent that they surrendered their 
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identity to the state apparatus. Hence, Romanian 
organizations under communism were, at best, a means of 
mass coercion, to multiply state power or to serve as so-
called “transmission belts” of state policies (Stoiciu et al, 
2001).  
The most notable example of state controlled 
organizations were the official trade unions, which 
amalgamated with the party to ensure a powerful control 
over the society and to prevent the emergence of any form 
of power outside the communist party. Nevertheless, 
because they posed no organized political or social 
challenge to the regime, a number of other types of 
organizations were allowed to exist, some of them even 
with international affiliation (Stoiciu et al., 2001). These 
were mostly benign in nature, involving simple gatherings 
of traditional craftsmen, philately groups, sport clubs, or 
associations for people with disabilities (Saulean and 
Epure, 1998). However, some of the most numerous 
associations, such as the Writers’ Union, were influential 
enough to negotiate privileges for their members, but their 
autonomy was also reduced. On the other hand, in an 
attempt to boost its legitimacy, the regime was 
continuously mobilizing ordinary citizens in mass events, 
under the banner of regional organizations: youth 
movements, craftsmen or professional association, 
cultural groups, etc. (Stoiciu et al, 2001). However, these 
organizations only enjoyed formal autonomy, even if they 
were not literally subordinated to the state institutions. In 
practice, they were subject to severe limitations on their 
freedom to initiate and implement projects and the 
ideological compliance of organization activities was 
strictly controlled (Saulean and Epure, 1998). Moreover, 
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the state’s monopoly on welfare barred all formally 
autonomous organizations from engaging in the provision 
of social services, often seen as a core function of a fully 
developed nonprofit sector. 
 While the communist party used the obedient 
organizations to absorb the society, the opponents and 
dissident movements were promptly smashed by the 
infamous secret police, the Securitate. Therefore, most 
analysts agree that Romania did not have the type of 
organized movement of dissidence led by intellectuals 
with deep social roots, comparable with Solidarnosc in 
Poland or to Charter 77 movement in Czechoslovakia. By 
contrast, Romanian dissidents were either individuals 
with narrow agendas or mass labor movements with 
social agendas such as the miners’ strike in Jiu Valley in 
1977, which ended up with the imprisonment or the 
disappearance of its leaders (Stoiciu et al, 2001). The 
extremely violent and absolutist character of the regime 
also discouraged initiatives to reform and liberalization of 
the regime from inside. 
Therefore, by and large forms of collective 
opposition in communist Romania were rather isolated 
and did not have any realistic chance of success (Saulean 
and Epure, 1998, p.9). This has led to a total dominance 
of the communist party in the public sphere accompanied 
by resignation among many of the potential opponents of 
the regime. As a result, some intellectuals thought that the 
role of the elites was to promote a combination of artistic 
freedom with apathy and indifference towards the 
political and social environment, a Romanian version of 
the ivory tower issue revealed by Julien Benda in the 
thirties (Stoiciu et al, 2001). Unlike other Central and 
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Eastern European communist countries, Romania had no 
organized opposition to the regime that could provide 
citizens with examples of what an active civil society 
could do and prepare civic activists to take over the 
administration of the country after the regime’s fall. 
 Consequently, the transition to democracy has 
been shaped by the abruptness and violence11 of regime 
change (Petrescu, 2000). There was no previous openness 
of the communist regime that would have allowed civil 
society to organize and form an opposition to the 
communist elite. Immediately after regime change12 civil 
society was first represented by artists, or dissident 
intellectuals, well known public figures who contributed 
to confer legitimacy to the change of regime and who 
voiced the people’s choice for democracy. However, 
these were quickly pushed aside and power was grabbed 
by second tier communist apparatchiks. “Only then, when 
protesting the ‘stealing of the revolution’s gains,’ did 
Romanian civil society come to life, through its first, 
somewhat disorganized but vocal groups” (Petrescu, 
2000, p.217). Moreover, the emergent civil society groups 
created after the regime change started to define 
themselves in opposition with the new administration and 
its policies. Therefore, in the immediate aftermath of 1989 
in Romania, the concepts of political opposition and civil 
society’s autonomy from the state overlapped 
                                                          
11 More than 1300 people were killed or wounded in the street 
fighting during the fall of Ceausescu’s regime in December 1989. 
12 The regime change in Romania started as a popular uprising and 
ended up as a coup, as second rank communist eventually grabbed 
the power and pushed aside the spontaneous leaders of the 
revolution, which as mentioned above were mainly popular artists 
or former dissident intellectuals.  
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considerably (Carothers, 1996, p. 66). Consequently, a 
rather confrontational pattern of relations between civil 
society and government emerged in the early 1990s, and a 
general reluctance of public authorities toward the newly 
established NGOs. This attitude combined with a poor 
institutional framework and a relatively low 
administrative capacity of NGOs led to an almost non-
existent participation of civil society in governmental 
policy-making. 
 The number of civil society organizations, broadly 
defined, grew spectacularly in the early 1990s. Civil 
society groups had different natures: some of them were 
labor unions, others foundations, associations, 
movements, councils and federations. According to 
Stoiciu et al (2001) after the regime change the Romanian 
civil society started to develop a quid pro quo of the 
identity. While some groups claimed that the new regime 
was democratic in nature and represented the interests of 
all categories of citizens, others started to define civil 
society in opposition with the administration and its 
policies. Newly established organization under Law 
21/1924 (which was never abolished by the communist 
regime and remained in place until 2000) followed the 
same pattern of positioning. Some of them, called by 
Stoiciu et al “contextualists”, lobbied the administration, 
building up organizations such as labor unions or 
professional organizations, which aimed to participate in 
the welfare policy of the state. Others, named 
“progressists” opted for creating opposition movements, 
civic groups and human rights organizations pleading for 
social change and/or a reduced role of the state, or 
traditional institutions, as a necessary step for progress. 
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Organizations belonging to this latter category were 
supporters of the neo-liberal agenda and believed that 
after the cold war the liberal Western model of economic 
and social organization has no longer any real competitor, 
and has become the ultimate referent for defining 
progress. As to the civil society, the supporters of this 
approach believe that the level of its autonomy from state 
institutions indicates its level of development and that 
diversity and pluralism are more important than 
maintaining traditional cultural or social ties (Stoiciu et al, 
2001).  
International donors targeted this latter category, 
and therefore this chapter focuses mainly on the evolution 
of the “progressist” part of civil society. Donors attempt 
to link the newly emergent and disparate groups was only 
partly successful13. According to Carothers (1996, p. 66) 
many of the new organizations “were not serious 
initiatives but passing enthusiasms”. Other authors 
emphasize that the creation of civil society through 
foreign assistance has been supply driven. For instance, 
Petrescu (2000, p.218) argues that by offering funds, 
donors have created demand for civil society 
organizations “but mainly among those who would like 
some grant money and made a business out of obtaining 
grants”. However, the profile of civil society has evolved 
since that period, and by the mid 1990s, Carothers (1996, 
p. 66) already asserted that NGOs were more serious 
                                                          
13 A success story is the formation of Pro Democracy Association, 
a civic education and election monitoring NGO formed in 1990 
and which was one of the main actors of the FOIA coalition 
discussed in chapter 5. 
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ventures with more consequential long-term prospects 
than before.   
However, the political conditions of the early 
1990s, including extremely violent forms of control (such 
as the infamous incursions of miners to subdue the 
opposition forces in Bucharest), disregard of human 
rights, and disrespect for state institutions, favored 
antagonism between state and the so-called “progressist” 
organizations of civil society (Petrescu, 2000). The 
leaders of the communist successor party who formed the 
post 1989 Romanian government saw no need to develop 
NGOs for alternative viewpoints, civic engagement or 
other supposed democratic benefits. Rather, they followed 
the “communist credo Who is not with us is against us – 
thus all NGOs were enemies” (Petrescu, 2000, p.222). 
However, due to external pressures from Western 
governments14, which started to support the development 
of civil society, President Ion Iliescu refrained from 
restricting the NGOs. Gradually, open conflict abated and 
a tentative dialogue began, with prodding from Western 
governments and organizations (Petrescu, 2000). The 
victory of democratic opposition in the 1996 elections, 
due partly to the support from civic groups, improved the 
relations between government and civil society. However, 
as will be shown below the “partnership” did not last long 
and by 1997 the disappointed civil society went through 
                                                          
14 For instance, Petrescu (2000, pp.22-223) reports that in the early 
1990s the Romanian government avidly sought a resumption of 
“most favored nation” (MFN) trade status with the United States, 
and the US administration was judging whether Romania was 
really democratizing. According to Petrescu, under these 
conditions restricting NGOs would have been fatal to Romania’s 
hopes for MFN.   
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an identity crisis which eventually contributed to its de-
politicization.   
 After the fall of the communism, civil society in 
Romania went, according to Cristian Pirvulescu (2004), 
through three phases each corresponding more or less to 
an electoral cycle. The first phase from 1990 to 1992 
parliamentary and presidential elections15 faced the 
emergence of civil society organizations, which tended to 
focus their criticism more on the newly elected president 
and political elite. The main concern of the “progressist” 
part of the civil society was to keep the regime open and 
to expand the possibility of free expression (Carothers, 
1999). As a result they neglected issues such as internal 
management or public relations that would have helped 
them to consolidate their relations with each other and 
with the wider public.  
In the second phase from 1992 to 1997, including 
the 1996 elections, civil society continued to focus on the 
political landscape the reform of which seemed to be the 
main emergency facing the country. After the 1992 
elections the close links with the opposition parties were 
re-enforced. “The nomination of Emil Constantinescu, a 
founding member of a CSO called Civic Alliance, as a 
candidate of the Democrat Convention in 1992 and his 
election as president in 1996 seemed to indicate the 
success of civil society groups in influencing politics. 
However, in 1997 … Romanian civil society was gripped 
by a serious identity crisis: were they complicit with the 
government or a counterpart?” (Pirvulescu, 2004, p.9).  
                                                          
15 Both the 1990 and 1992 elections were won by the communist 
successor party and the second tier ex-communist leader, Ion 
Iliescu. 
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 According to Pirvulescu (2004) in the third phase, 
from 1997 to present, civil society has undergone a 
process of redefinition and professionalization. Its main 
task was to regain its independence from the political 
sector. After the 2000 elections, civil society 
organization’s focused on fixing an unbalanced political 
system. Although the ruling Social Democratic Party held 
only a relative majority (48%) of parliamentary seats, a 
divided opposition, composed of the Democrat Party, the 
National Liberal Party and the extremist Greater Romania 
Party, was unable to mount a challenge. In addition, over 
four years, the Social Democrats managed to leverage this 
slim advantage into significant local control, so that in 
2004, over 70% of mayors were Social Democrats 
compared to just 35% in 2000 (Pirvulescu, 2004, p.9). 
 What this brief review of civil society’s evolution 
reveals is that NGOs focused more on holding the 
government accountable and prevent the abuses of a 
political elite not always fully committed to democratic 
rule. By playing this watchdog democratic function civil 
society organizations contributed crucially to the 
consolidation of democracy in Romania. However, what 
was lost through this focus on elites and political 
institutions was the importance of Romanian civil society 
as a social space whose viability and capacity to generate 
action very much depends on the way citizens see 
themselves in relation to public authorities (Pirvulescu, 
2004). After the 2000 elections, many CSOs had the 
opportunity to democratize the governmental decision-
making process and perform better their advocacy 
function, as will be shown in the chapter three of this 
book.  
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2.2 The role of external assistance in developing 
civil society in Romania: An overview 
 
International assistance has come into Romania in 
many forms, from many sources and for many recipients. 
However this section deals only with the small slice of 
foreign aid going to programs that are carried out 
explicitly to develop civil society as a means to promote 
democracy. This section poses several difficulties, due to 
the high diversity of funding sources and the lack of 
centralized and updated information regarding aid to civil 
society in Romania. Therefore, this section does not 
attempt to present a detailed analysis of all foreign 
donors16 active in Romania, but rather to outline the 
general trends in international assistance for civil society. 
In terms of funding, the foreign sources account 
for the biggest share of the NGOs’ income (see Appendix 
C, List of Principal Donors in Romania). However, foreign 
funds are unevenly distributed across different NGO 
sectors; while some fields such as advocacy sector (human 
rights, environment, civic education) receive almost 100% 
of their funding from abroad, others (culture and arts) are 
almost completely supported by local businesses and 
communities (Dakova et al, 2000). Foreign support consists 
of funding that comes through open grants programs, but also 
through partnerships between foreign and Romanian 
organizations. 
                                                          
16 According to Petrescu (2000) the major donors in Romania 
during the 1990s were the US government acting mainly through 
USAID and the EU, which has sponsored PHARE. Several dozens 
of other US and European public and private organizations and 
foundations have also played an important role in supporting civil 
society.   
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The most challenging task for NGOs remains 
however self-sustainability. A comparison of NGOs funds 
in 1995 and 1998, as emphasized in Table 1, indicates a 
promising diversification of resources and apparently a 
decreased reliance on foreign funding. According to some 
authors, the approximate amount of funds allocated for the 
NGO sector in 1995 was about $189.2 million, 
representing 0.06 percent of the Romanian GDP (Petrescu, 
2000).   
 
Table 1. Funding sources for Romanian NGOs 
 
Sources 1995 
% of 
total 
1998 
% of 
total 
Foreign governmental, non-governmental,   
and private funds 
 
56 % 
 
36 % 
Donations and contributions of the 
population (including membership fees) 
 
12 % 
 
28 % 
Fees for services 11 % 12 % 
Sponsorships and donations from 
businesses 
7 % 13 % 
Subsidies and fees for service provision 
from     Governmental sector 
 
5 % 
 
7% 
Dividends N/A 4% 
Other sources 9% N/A 
Source: Petrescu (2000, p.219) 
 
 The data presented above correlated with a 
steady increase in the number of NGOs during the 
1990s indicates that while the foreign funding 
decreased, NGOs have moved toward alternative 
sources of funds. These are, first, individual 
contributions and membership fees and second, 
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sponsorship and donations from local businesses. 
Despite an increased collaboration between NGOs and 
government especially after the 1996 elections won by 
the democratic opposition, the amount of subsidies and 
fees for services from the government remained low. 
The data also shows that foreign donors though much 
reduced since 1995, still accounted for the largest share 
of NGOs revenue, due to the economic downturn of the 
1990s with many companies going bankrupt and the 
standard of living falling (Petrescu, 2000). However, 
even in these harsh economic and social conditions the 
number of NGOs still increased mainly as a 
consequence of the support of international donors.   
 Nevertheless, more recent studies have pointed to 
an interesting phenomenon, which might help us to 
interpret the funding sources in a different light. Drawing 
on the findings of a comprehensive review of the active 
donors’ community in Romania, Porumb et al (2001) 
conclude that in terms of registration, most donors are 
external or are branches and representative offices of 
external donors. The authors argue that, in the recent past, 
significant and sometimes successful attempts have been 
made to “localize” the operations of larger donors by 
increasing the number of local staff or opening new 
offices. Moreover, they claim that the vast majority of 
donors active in Romania have a local presence, ranging 
from full offices to a part-time consultant. Only one third 
of the donors are registered17 as “purely” Romanian 
organizations (Porumb et al, 2001).  
                                                          
17 Only few years ago, this number would have been much 
smaller, but the number of registered grant-giving entities in 
Romania increased with the creation of the Soros Open Network 
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 Although from a legal and managerial point of 
view these organizations are now part of the local 
donor community, the funds that are disbursed remain 
almost exclusively foreign. According to Porumb et al 
(2001), over 90% of grant support18 for Romanian 
NGOs from donors who provided quantitative 
information for their review comes from external 
sources, even if it is distributed by Romanian 
organizations or branch/representative offices of 
international donors. Moreover in 2000, funding from 
European sources was roughly equal with that from 
American sources (Porumb et al, 2001). 
 Many researchers argue that the development of 
the Romanian NGO sector has been supply-driven. 
That is, demand for NGOs was created mainly due to 
the availability of foreign funds (Petrescu, 2001, 
Carothers, 1996). In addition, other authors claim that 
                                                                                                            
and of new grant making programs with the Princess Margarita of 
Romania Foundation and the Environmental Partnership 
Foundation, most of which offer small grants. 
18 The Romanian governmental funding for NGOs with the 
exception of the Romanian Social Development Fund (which is 
based on a multilateral loan agreement with World Bank) and co-
funding is not included in this review. Funding for NGOs from 
Romanian government sources has been provided by the Ministry 
of Youth, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, Department 
for the Protection of Minorities, Ministry of Public Information, 
Direction for Child Protection etc. However, governmental direct 
funding for NGOs remains only symbolic. For instance, in the 
State Budget for 2003, under the Chapter concerning funding for 
NGOs there were allocated only 38.242.332.000 ROL that is 
approximately 1.092.638 € (Draft of Strategic Plan for 2003-2007 
concerning the civil society sector available at: 
http://www.fdsc.ro/ro/documentmie/Documentul%20de%20progra
mare-Phare,%20var%201.doc).  
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although the language of international assistance 
worldwide is one of “equal partnership” the donor-
recipient relation is one of dependency (Schmitter and 
Brouwer 1999). However, these assertions seem to be 
in contradiction with the findings of a survey carried 
out by the Romanian Civil Society Development 
Foundation in 2001. Despite the high degree to which 
non-governmental organizations depend on foreign 
financing resources, provided either by international 
organizations, governments or private foundations, 
respondents of the stakeholder19 survey tend to 
downplay the importance of donors’ agenda. Most of 
them claimed that donors’ policies play a less important 
role in determining the organizations’ activities than the 
internal management (Epure et al., 2001). A quarter of 
respondents think that their activities are not influenced 
at all by donors’ policies, while more than half believe 
that donors’ policies have little influence on their 
decisions. The results of the survey indicate the 
subjective perception of NGO leaders that internal 
decision, rather than external pressure is increasingly 
important in running the organizations (Epure et al. 
2001). This could be the result of a diversification of 
external sources so that NGOs do not entirely depend 
on only one donor that can dictate its agenda.  
Foreign donors have adopted a variety of 
assistance strategies, which have changed over time. In 
a review of the Romanian NGO sector in 2000, Dakova 
et al, present several common features of donors’ 
                                                          
19 The findings are based on 228 questionnaires completed by civil 
society organizations, business, media, researchers, and public 
administration representatives.    
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strategies as identified by the respondents of a survey 
of NGO community. In the early years of their presence 
in Romania, international donors developed strategies 
based mainly on the domestic NGO tradition in their 
own countries; later they started paying more attention 
to local needs. Lack of strategic coordination among 
donors led to an inconsistent pattern of funding, which 
was exacerbated by intermediaries’ inadequate 
representation of sectoral interests (Dakova et al, 2000). 
However, donors are organized in a Donors’ Forum20 
while NGOs have their own National Forum. If the two 
entities act strategically and improve their 
representativeness there is potential for more effective 
communication and therefore for influencing future 
funding strategies. 
                                                          
20 The Romanian Donors' Forum (RDF) was initiated in November 
1999 when a group of foreign and indigenous donors active in 
Romania, came together with the understanding that they needed 
to improve their cooperation. The initial group of donors 
comprised of AIDRom (the Ecumenical Association of Churches 
in Romania), Carpathian Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott 
Foundation, Community Partnership Foundation, Open Society 
Foundation, Princess Margarita Foundation and USAID decided to 
set up a structure through which donors could share information 
about their own activities, take joint initiatives to solve pressing 
issues and communicate more effectively. The RDF was thus 
established as an informal network of 7 donors, later joined by the 
8th, the Delegation of the European Commission in Romania, and 
elected a Steering Committee, mandated to guide and assist the 
development of the RDF, and a Secretariat, hosted by the Princess 
Margarita Foundation. Presently, the RDF comprises now 
17members representing bilateral, multilateral, and private grant-
makers, both indigenous and foreign, as well as a public Romanian 
Foundation. More information about RDF is available at: 
http://www.donorsforum.ro/index.php.  
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According to Dakova et al (2000), in the past, 
international donors tended to consult with NGO 
leaders and influential experts in Bucharest, which in 
some cases led to serving a limited circle of interests. 
These NGO leaders often did not recognize their 
responsibility as “spokespersons” for the sector and 
expressed only personal views or self-serving interests. 
Although donors recognized the need to consult more 
broadly, they will continue to rely on intermediaries 
and/or other donors for information, placing great 
importance on the reliability and validity of their views 
(Dakova et al 2000). In addition, some donors tried to 
encourage cooperation and partnership within the NGO 
sector through requirements for joint applications 
between two or more NGOs. In general, this led to the 
creation of “false partnerships” to solicit funding and 
now donors prefer to offer support to networks and 
umbrella organizations which already have a vision and 
strategy for their activities (Dakova et al, 2000). 
In some key areas, such as the advocacy sector, 
foreign donors developed strong NGOs that are entirely 
dependent on high levels of input from abroad and will 
continue to be so for the next years. For instance, 
almost all important human rights advocacy groups 
have received substantial international support. The 
support has also involved, besides direct grants, 
technical assistance – in particular, in-country advice 
and assistance by long-term advisors. “This assistance 
appears to have been more valued than much of the 
training and advice in other areas … because it was 
carried out primarily by a few advisors working in-
country in a sustained fashion rather than by short term 
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visiting experts presenting materials at occasional 
seminars” (Carothers, 1996, p.68).  
Nevertheless, one can notice that when 
Ceausescu regime fell there were no NGOs in Romania 
(Petrescu, 2000, p. 217). Fifteen year later, the 
Romanian nonprofit sector included about 4,000 active 
NGOs out of approximately 70,000 registered 
associations and foundations, according to Romania’s 
leading civil society watchdog Centras21. Other 
sources22 put the number of active groups closer to 
2,500. Moreover, the main point made by the analysts 
of the Romanian NGOs is that aid from abroad has 
been a major support in building what has become an 
important network of NGOs, capable of influencing 
state policies, monitoring and assisting the government 
in a wide range of issues (Petrescu, 2000, p. 232).  
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, civil society re-emerged and 
developed in post-communist Romania and the foreign 
assistance facilitated this process and helped the young 
                                                          
21 Cited in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Nation in Transit 2004: 
Romania, Freedom House, available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2004/romania200
4.pdf. 
22 According to these sources, the total number of Romanian 
NGOs ranges between 20.000 and 30.000, with an annual growth 
rate of 10%. The number of active NGOs is estimated to be 
between 2.500 si 7000. The data presented above represents a 
compilation of different sources: USAID NGO Sustainability 
Index 2002 and 2003, and the database of the Foundation for Civil 
Society Foundation from 2000. 
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sector to gain more influence despite the legacies of the 
communist regime. However the development of the 
newly established NGO sector was mainly supply 
driven, that is the availability of funds fostered the 
demand for NGOs. Domestic initiatives for creating 
civil society organizations were inhibited, as there were 
no traditions of autonomous associational life, while 
the economic resources were controlled in a significant 
proportion by a hostile public sector. Moreover, due to 
specific political conditions mentioned above, the so-
called “progressive” part of the civil society emerged 
as an opposition to the government and rapidly adopted 
the rhetoric and ideas inspired by the neo-liberal 
agenda of their donors, pushing for reforms and 
liberalization. As will be shown in the next chapter, 
these organizations have gradually developed various 
strategies for increasing the space of civil society’s 
participation in policymaking.  
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3. THE PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN 
POLICY-MAKING PROCESSES 
 
Scholars often view political participation in 
democracy through the lens of economic theory, 
depicting voting as public “consumption” of policies 
produced by political elites (see Downs, 1957). 
According to this minimalist conception of democracy, 
political participation means only that people have the 
opportunity to refuse or accept through elections the 
policies designed by the leaders who are to rule them 
(Schumpeter 1976, Downs, 1957). However, without 
refuting the importance of elections in a democratic 
regime this study argues that electoral democracy 
overlooks an important part of citizens’ involvement in 
politics besides voting, i.e. organized groups that seek 
to influence the “production” of policies. Moreover this 
book argues that participation of civil society groups in 
policy–making is key to democratic consolidation, as it 
increases the accountability, responsiveness and 
legitimacy of democratic regimes. In this chapter, I 
analyze both the institutional framework, which 
regulates civil society’s participation in the decision-
making in post-communist Romania, and the actual 
involvement of NGOs in policy. The evolution of civil 
society’s participation in policy-making after the 
collapse of the communist regime can be broadly 
divided into three phases: before 1996, between 1996 
and 2000, and after 2000. 
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3.1 Confrontation and exclusion before 1996 
 
 In the immediate aftermath of the political 
changes of 1989, the relations between civil society and 
the Romanian Government were rather tense. While civil 
society contested the Government, dominated by second 
tier communists elected in 1990, the authorities saw civil 
society more like an enemy than a social partner. 
Moreover, in the early period of transition, authorities 
looked at externally funded NGOs with suspicion and 
disregarded them as illegitimate organizations (Petrescu, 
2000). This initial tense relation shaped the design of the 
subsequent legal framework regulating public 
participation in policy-making.  
 The Romanian Constitution23 adopted and 
approved by a national referendum in 1991 provided for 
most of the basic rights for public participation. Citizens 
as individuals or as a group of citizens have the right of 
expression, the right to information, the right of free 
assembly, the right of association and the right to petition. 
The Constitution also guarantees the right of the public to 
gain access to information24 in the public interest and 
states that this right cannot be restricted. It also obliges 
public authorities to provide correct information related to 
public affairs, according to their competence (Art.31). 
The general right of petition is stipulated by the 
Constitution, but petitions can be drawn up only in the 
name of the applicants. In practice this means that, for 
example, NGOs can draw up petitions only in the name of 
                                                          
23 The Constitution was revisited in 2003.  
24 However until 2001, Romania had no Freedom of Information 
Act to enforce the constitutional right to information.  
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their members, which limits their capacity to mobilize 
wide public support (1996).  
 In Romania, the Parliament is the single law-
making entity. However, there are no imperative public 
participation provisions in the Statutes of the 
Parliamentary Chambers, or in the law-making process. 
The public had the right to propose amendments to the 
Constitution by initiative. Such motions required the 
petition of at least 500,000 citizens with the right to vote, 
subject to geographical distribution requirements. The 
right to the legislative initiative is also guaranteed; a 
minimum of 250,000 citizens25 with the right to vote is 
needed to take this initiative. The petitioners must come 
from at least one quarter of the nation's counties, with at 
least 10,000 petitions from each of them. Under these 
circumstances, the only possibility NGOs have to make 
an impact on the legislative process was to draft and 
propose laws by public initiative (which required 
considerable effort), or to approach Members of 
Parliament (MPs) and to ask them to put their policy 
proposals on the Parliamentary table (Barna, 1996).  
 The government undertakes the vast majority of 
legislative drafting and policy making. Though the 
Constitution generally declares that social organizations 
should be consulted in the government's activities, during 
the period analyzed here (1990-1996) no other laws or 
rules required the government to take into account or 
                                                          
25 The revisited Constitution (2003) provides the right to promote a 
legislative initiative to at least 100,000 citizens entitled to vote. 
The citizens who exercise their right to a legislative initiative must 
belong to at least one quarter of the country's counties, while, in 
each of those counties or the Municipality of Bucharest, at least 
5,000 signatures should be registered in support of such initiative.  
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respond to public comments. Consequently, in most of the 
cases, the opinion of the public was not included in the 
legislative process (Barna, 1996). The only social partners, 
which had an institutional channel of collaboration with the 
central authorities, were trade unions and business 
associations. These participated along with the 
Government in a tripartite consultative body called the 
Economic and Social Council. Other social partners were 
not included in institutionalized consultative arrangements. 
Therefore, the public in general and especially the NGOs 
had only limited possibilities to make a direct impact on the 
decision-making process of parliament and at central 
government level. 
 At the local level regulations were more favorable 
to public participation (Barna, 1996). Law on Local 
Public Administration No.69/1991 included provisions 
allowing the mayor to submit matters to the public for 
consultation and approval. The city/county council 
meetings were open to the public, but the public had no 
right to comment during the meeting. The agenda of the 
meetings were made available to the public two or three 
days before the meeting and the public could comment 
and submit proposals, which were registered at the 
Secretariat (Barna, 1996).  
  As there was no Access to Information Law in 
Romania until 2001, information could be requested only 
upon the provision stipulated in the Constitution (article 
31), which guarantees a general right to information. 
However, there was no efficient mechanism established to 
provide reports and receive information of public interest, 
and consequently information was available only through 
non-formal methods often encouraging corruption and 
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clientelism. It also hindered civil society’s efforts to fulfill 
its democratic watchdog function and hold the 
government accountable.  Moreover, information was 
difficult to access due to the general veil of secrecy, 
(which still prevails in some institutions) as well as the 
lack of citizens’ experience in requesting information 
(Barna 1996).  
In conclusion, during the 1990-1996 period 
consultations between the authorities and NGOs and 
public hearings have been very rare. The legacies of the 
past influenced this outcome, as during the communist 
period decision-making was the responsibility of the 
authorities and there were no traditions of transferring it to 
the public. Consequently, authorities inherited a 
paternalistic mentality and more often their relation with 
the people was based on the principle “We know better to 
decide what is good for the citizens”. Moreover, as in the 
communist regime everything was centrally controlled, 
people were discouraged to use their own initiative, and 
this passive attitude concerning public affairs prevailed 
long after the collapse of the communist regime. 
 
3.2 Participation and co-optation between 1996-
2000 
 
Relationships with central government improved 
significantly following the 1996 election of a government, 
which openly acknowledged the importance of civil 
society to its electoral success and therefore accepted an 
increased role for the NGOs in policymaking (Dakova, 
2000). The new government established structures to 
enable meaningful dialogue with the sector at both 
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national and local levels. At national level two structures 
were conceived to fulfil this role. First a Civil Society 
Department was created at the Presidency of Romania 
whose mandate was to ensure information flow between 
the sector and government, to consult NGOs on relevant 
issues and to provide opportunities for the sector’s voice 
to be heard in high-level government. Second, an NGO 
Liaison Office was established within the government. In 
addition to information exchange, its mandate was to 
coordinate legislative efforts with respect to NGOs and to 
support the network of county NGO liaison officers. 
Besides these two structures, there was appointed an 
advisory group of NGO experts to the Council of 
Ministers, which provided input on different NGO related 
matters (Dakova, 2000). 
 Moreover, NGO leaders and experts were 
appointed to the new governmental structures and in 
different other positions. The co-optation of civil society 
leaders has had a two-fold effect which illustrates the 
identity crisis (see the first section of chapter two) through 
which civil society went during this period. On the one 
hand it improved mutual understanding of roles, powers 
and limitations and created a much more open and 
communicative relationship between government and the 
sector (Dakova 2000). But on the other hand, the intimate 
ties with the government had their drawbacks too.  
According to an NGO leader quoted in Dakova (2000, 
p.21) “the relationship became too friendly – NGOs 
started to do the job of the government and criticism or 
campaigning became difficult”. This highly personalized 
type of relationships between some NGOs and 
government has led to an uncritical attitude toward 
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government officials. Moreover, it favored personal ties 
and connections and therefore hindered the advancement 
of institutionalized consultative mechanisms between 
NGOs and the government. The consequence was that 
instead of promoting the institutionalization of civil 
society’s participation in governmental policy-making, 
the intimate friendship and personal ties between some 
NGO and government leaders eventually substituted it.  
 On the other hand, at the local level cooperation 
with authorities has improved significantly but there were 
several factors that hinder effective partnership with 
NGOs too. Structures have been created to facilitate this 
relationship and NGO Liaison Officers were established 
in every county in 1996 with a remit to maintain two-way 
communication with the local NGOs. However, 
according to Dakova (2000) local officials have had a 
limited awareness of the role of NGOs, and have 
promoted relationships that were often dependent on 
personal connections. In general, NGOs only received 
support if their activities fitted within local development 
strategies that were rarely created in consultation with 
NGOs (Dakova, 2000). Moreover, local authorities had 
limited powers and funds due to the slow process of 
decentralization and this impeded the partnership with 
local NGOs, which at the local level were mainly oriented 
towards service provision.  
 Summing up, during the 1996-2000 period the 
government’s attitude toward NGOs improved 
considerably. Several structures were created to make the 
voice of the NGOs heard.  However, instead of further 
institutionalizing the participation of civil society in 
policy-making, the authorities have personalized it. 
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Consequently, except for a small number of NGOs that had 
good connections with to the authorities, the vast majority 
of civil society organization still reported low access to the 
legislature to voice their point of view (Epure, 2001). 
While the majority of NGOs seemed to be rarely involved 
in the governmental policy formulation, they appeared to 
co-operate more successfully with authorities in the 
implementation of public policies.  The poor level of 
institutional development, related to the low level of 
funding, and a certain reluctance of public authorities 
towards dialoguing with civil society are some of the 
factors, which account for this situation (Epure, 2001). 
 
3.3 Coalition-building and institutionalization 
after 2000 
 
After 2000 civil society embarked on a positive 
trend, which suggest the beginning of the consolidation 
and maturity phase. With the support of international 
assistance a professionalized and experienced civil society 
emerged, which managed to reach the critical mass that 
enabled it to become a more visible actor in the Romanian 
political landscape. Moreover, a group of advocacy 
NGOs, trained and supported by international actors, 
increasingly advanced their reform proposals by forming 
broader coalitions and mobilizing support from media, 
trade unions and business associations. Subsequently, 
they managed to successfully push for the creation of 
institutional channels and mechanisms necessary for the 
civil society to monitor and participate in the policy-
making process. As a result, after more than a decade 
since the collapse of communism, Romanian civil society 
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has now the institutional means to participate in decision-
making and to increasingly contribute to the consolidation 
of democracy by holding the government more 
accountable, responsive and nevertheless more legitimate.  
Two important laws adopted in this period 
particularly facilitate the contribution of civil society to 
the consolidation of democracy. The first one is the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, or Law 544/2001 
regarding free access to information of public interest), 
advocated by a coalition of civil society groups and 
adopted in 2001. Briefly, this law creates the institutional 
and legal framework that enables civil society to obtain 
information from public institutions, which in turn, is 
crucial for fulfilling its democratic function of checking 
and limiting the power and potential abuses of the state26.  
Moreover the function of controlling the state 
power, overlaps with the civic function of institutionally 
reforming the state by opening up the decision-making 
process and enabling the public and civil society to 
participate. Therefore, the positive trend of civil society 
involvement in policy-making, inaugurated by the 
adoption of FOIA, continued with the establishment of a 
permanent “Coalition for Transparency” of NGOs that 
pushed successfully for the subsequent passage of 
transparency legislation and monitored its 
implementation, (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004). Accordingly, 
the second important law for promoting civil society’s 
participation in decision-making was the so-called 
                                                          
26 The reasons that account for the importance and necessity of 
FOIA in Romania are discussed in detail in Chapter five of this 
book. 
59
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
“Sunshine Law” (Law 52/2003 regarding Transparency 
of Decision-making in Public Administration).  
The “Coalition for Transparency” played an 
important role in the legislative improvements mentioned 
above and was set out to enhance public participation in 
government and advocated the introduction of the 
“Sunshine Law”. The law offers a comprehensive set of 
guidelines and regulations for public participation in 
policy-making and governance in Romania. The 
“Coalition for Transparency” provided training in how to 
implement the new law and also published a guide for the 
general public and the administration. The “sunshine law” 
came into effect in 2003 that opened the decision-making 
process in public institutions to public consultation and 
participation 
 Why are these legislative and institutional 
improvements important for the consolidation of 
democracy in Romania? To answer this question I will 
refer to a study27 completed in October 2002 by 
Transparency International Romania, in partnership with 
IRIS Center Romania and Media Monitoring Agency 
"Academia Catavencu". The study was concerned with 
the practice of consultations between public 
administration and civil society, prior to transparency of 
decision-making being regulated. The preliminary 
conclusions revealed several problems concerning civil 
society participation in consultation processes. First, there 
                                                          
27 The study is cited in Stefan, Laura; Ion Georgescu; Oana Zabava 
(2003) – “Transparency of Decision-Making 
in Public Administration - Citizens and Administration Guide”, 
Bucharest: Transparency International Romania, available at: 
http://www.transparency.org.ro/doc/ghid_transparenta_eng.pdf 
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was no coherent or consistent approach on behalf of the 
administration with respect to consulting and involving 
civil society in the decision-making process, regardless of 
whether the adoption of normative acts is at stake. 
Second, although cooperation between public institutions 
and non-governmental organizations represented a 
success in some instances, the rule was lack of 
transparency. Third, institutions, which preferred opacity, 
justified their stance through restrictive or abusive legal 
interpretations that reflect the secrecy culture of 
Romanian public administration. Fourth, non-
governmental participation in decision-making processes 
was the result of the NGOs' initiative. Such initiatives 
were successful only with few public institutions, whose 
openness was due to certain individuals in the top 
management. Fifth, dialogue between authorities and civil 
society was accepted in principle, rather than called for in 
concrete decisions. Sixth, consultation techniques are at 
their beginning; hence, hesitation is characteristic, even if 
they had already been practiced. State institutions seemed 
more interested in such techniques as an end, rather than 
the means. Practical aspects that ensure their success were 
not taken into consideration, and contributions from the 
process were ignored when establishing the final version 
of the act.  
Overall, after 2000 civil society engaged in more 
advocacy campaigns than before and more coalitions 
were formed. Advocacy topics included domestic 
violence, child protection, anti-corruption, environment, 
constitutional revisions, and political party activities 
(USAID 2003). These advocacy efforts, however, were 
not always successful. For instance, in 2001-2002 trade 
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unions, business organizations, and NGOs joined the 
Civic Initiative for the Responsibility of the Political Act 
(ICRAP). The coalition attempted to collect the 250,000 
signatures needed to submit a new Electoral Code to 
Parliament. Although not successful in promoting the 
legislative proposal, according to USAID, the coalition 
succeeded in raising public awareness regarding the need 
for electoral and constitutional reforms (USAID, 2002). 
In 2003 more than 150 NGOs advocated against 
provisions in the draft Law on political party financing 
allowing political parties to receive financial support from 
NGOs. Unfortunately, regardless of their letters of protest 
to the parliament, the presidency, the media, and 
international donors, those provisions remained in the 
final version of the law (USAID 2003).  
 On the positive side one can notice the increasing 
number of Romanian think tanks which have developed 
considerably and play a growing role in policy design and 
advocacy, including fiscal and social reform, 
anticorruption legislation, FOIA implementation, and the 
policy capacity of parties (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004). The 
association of Romanian think tanks with various Western 
agencies (the USAID and the World Bank, for example) 
also indicates their expanded role as domestic consultants 
assisting the government in the reform process (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2004). Donors and international organizations are 
increasingly relying on these externally funded think 
tanks to influence the governance of democratizing 
countries and pursue specific neo-liberal agenda. In other 
words, besides the top-down direct pressure on governing 
elites for certain reforms, international organizations seek 
to use NGOs and other civil society organizations for a 
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more discreet, bottom-up influence of governance in new 
democracies.    
The evolutions presented above reflect the 
growing professionalization of civil society organizations. 
In addition, the processes of joining NATO and the EU 
also facilitated the role of advocacy NGO in policy-
making as these processes led to an increased opportunity 
to lobby international organization to require certain 
reforms and thus to put pressure on the Romanian 
government. Moreover, the government began to rely 
more on the expertise of civil society groups, and 
dialogue and consultation between them increased 
significantly (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2004). This improved 
relationship has been reflected by the cooperative EU 
accession effort between the Ministry of European 
Integration and some of the country’s most reputable 
Romanian NGOs. Despite the important achievements of 
a relatively small number of externally funded NGOs, 
higher expectations still exist in relation to the advocacy 
role of the broad community of civil society groups. 
Moreover, they should also promote new patterns of 
behavior, which are linked to democratic values, thus 
generating social change and promoting democratic 
consolidation. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, the Romanian civil society went through 
several phases of participation in policy-making after 
1989. In the early stages of transition the newly emerged 
NGOs were seen with suspicion by authorities which 
dismissed them as illegitimate partners in policy-making. 
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However, gradually when democracy started to 
consolidate and the Romanian governments made firm 
commitments to Euro-Atlantic integration, externally 
funded NGOs became an increasingly important voice in 
influencing policies and pushing for a neo-liberal agenda.  
 Having examined the general trends of civil 
society involvement in policy making, in the next chapter 
I will move on to discuss the findings of my empirical 
analysis, namely the impact of international assistance on 
the NGOs which participated in the campaign for 
liberalizing access to public information in Romania.   
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4. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 
ON THE ROMANIAN  ADVOCACY NGOS: CASE 
STUDY  
 
 
This chapter analyzes the influence of international 
assistance on the advocacy NGOs that participated in the 
coalition for the promotion of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). I leave aside an evaluation of their specific 
advocacy activities concerning FOIA (which will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter) and focus on the 
characteristics of these organizations. More specifically, I 
will analyze their sources of funding, level of 
organization, connections with domestic and international 
actors, and types of activities. However, before 
proceeding with this analysis I will briefly discuss the 
sample selection and the methodological approach. 
 
4.1 Case selection and methodology 
 
In order to test whether international assistance 
promotes or rather hinders the role of civil society in 
consolidating democracy I conduct a case study of post-
communist Romania. More specifically, I investigate the 
role of the Romanian advocacy NGOs in liberalizing 
access to public information28. In the context of a 
potential conflict between international assistance and the 
fulfillment of civil society’s democratic functions, the 
advocacy sector represents an extreme case due to several 
reasons.  
                                                          
28 A Freedom of Information Act was passed in Romania in 2001. 
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First, in Romania external donors have financed 
this sector in an overwhelming proportion. As a result, the 
Romanian advocacy NGOs’ might help us find most of 
the drawbacks or conversely most of the benefits of 
external assistance since advocacy groups provide typical 
examples of internationally supported organizations. 
Therefore, out of the whole range of civil society groups it 
is in the functioning of this sector where one might expect 
to find all of the “pathologies” preached by the critics of 
international assistance to civil society. In other words, 
critics of foreign aid could claim that this sector is least 
likely to properly fulfill its role in consolidating 
democracy. Alternatively, if one claims that international 
assistance enhances civil society’s potential to promote 
democratic consolidation, we should expect that advocacy 
NGOs decisively contribute to the deepening of 
democracy.     
A second argument that accounts for the selected 
case as an extreme one points to the Romanian 
institutional setup that, until recently, provided an 
extremely limited space for civil society to participate in 
the governmental decision making process. In such a 
“hostile” institutional environment, combined with a 
significant lack of participatory and partnership traditions 
both on the part of authorities and civil society, one could 
expect that advocacy campaigns initiated by NGOs have 
the least chances to succeed. Consequently, if externally 
supported advocacy NGOs turn out to be successful in 
their activities even under these harsh circumstances, this 
might provide strong evidence supporting the claims of 
the promoters of international assistance for civil society 
as a means to consolidate democracy.  
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A third argument for the case selection refers to 
the analysis of a particular campaign initiated by a 
coalition of advocacy NGOs for increasing access to 
public information in Romania. Freedom of information 
represents a sensitive issue as it has many direct political 
implications that penetrate to the very essence of 
democratic consolidation in both its representative and 
participatory elements. That is, free access to information 
deeply resonates with measures promoting human rights, 
meaningful political participation, accountability, 
transparency, and anticorruption policies all of these 
representing issues on which many Romanian official 
stakeholders have had a bad record. Therefore, under 
these circumstances, one might argue that promoting a 
Freedom of Information Act in 2001 could be considered 
a difficult test for the capacity of civil society to 
participate and influence the policy making process. 
 However, as mentioned above this chapter will 
focus only on the organizational characteristic of the 
NGOs involved in all stages of the FOIA campaign. 
Despite their different areas of work, these groups share 
one common feature: they are an example of foreign 
supported civil society organization and in many ways 
typify most of the NGOs in Romania that define 
themselves as advocacy organizations. Therefore, in this 
chapter I focus my analysis on areas in which most of the 
criticism regarding externally funded NGOs arises: level 
of organization, membership and leadership; dependence 
on foreign funding; relations with other domestic and 
international groups; types of activities. In order to 
investigate the impact of external funding on these 
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organizations, I e-mailed a questionnaire29 in English (see 
Appendix A) to six organizations that formed the FOIA 
coalition. Four of them completed and returned the 
questionnaire30. While the sample is admittedly small, it 
nevertheless provides an insight into a group of 
organizations that work in the area of democratization and 
might point out the positive as well as negative effects of 
foreign founding. The results from all four groups are 
included below. Moreover, when data was available from 
additional sources (such as web sites, reports, etc) 
regarding the other two organizations (that did not 
respond to the questionnaire) it was also included in the 
analysis. However, most of the discussion below is based 
on questionnaire information.  
 
4.2 Level of organization, membership and 
leadership      
 
I begin this section by presenting a brief history of 
the organizations and their areas of interest. Then I will 
move on to examine their levels of institutional 
development using their leadership turnover as a proxy 
for their level of institutionalization and their formal 
mechanisms regarding participation in the decision-
making as a proxy for their internal level of 
                                                          
29 I gathered questions from several sources. For instance, I wrote 
many questions similar to those in surveys by Henderson (2003), 
Epure et al (2001), and one doctoral dissertation student (Mehmet 
Umut Korkut, CEU, 2003) 
30 Three executive directors of the organizations and one program 
coordinator filled out the questionnaires. They have completed the 
questionnaire in English.    
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democratization. I conclude with some observations 
regarding their leadership and membership. 
In general, critics of externally supported NGOs 
contend that these are “opportunistic” organizations of 
recent creation that switch their goals according to the 
available funds. Contrary to this claim, most groups 
discussed here have demonstrated a quite long and steady 
history of work in the democratization field. The average 
age of the organizations surveyed was above eleven years 
with two of them being created in the first year right after 
the collapse of the communist regime (1990) while the 
“youngest” group was created in 1999. All of them 
worked since their creation in fields related to 
democratization, such as human rights, civic education, 
freedom of expression, anti-corruption, etc.  
In this paragraph, I will briefly present the six 
organizations that participated in the FOIA coalition. 
Although some of them are affiliated to several 
international organizations or NGO networks, their staff 
and leadership is provided by Romanian nationals and all 
have their headquarters in Bucharest. Pro Democracy 
Association (APD), founded in 1990, is an NGO aiming 
to promote civic education and participation, and 
advocates for community and socially oriented 
democratization. Established in 1990, APADOR-CH 
(Association for the Defense of Human Rights in 
Romania – the Helsinki Committee) is a non-
governmental, non-profit organization that strives to 
protect human rights. The Center for Independent 
Journalism Romania (CJI) was created in 1994 as a 
project of the Independent Journalism Foundation in New 
York and it offers courses and training for journalists and 
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media organizations. However, the director and the staff 
are Romanian nationals. The Romanian Academic 
Society (SAR), founded in 1995, is a think tank, which 
aims to contribute to good governance by conducting 
research on different policy issues and doing advocacy 
work. The Media Monitoring Agency – Academia 
Catavencu created in 1994, is an NGO working in the 
field of media development, freedom of expression, 
human rights and anti-corruption. Finally, Transparency 
International Romania (TI-R) was created in 1999 and 
then it gained the status of Romanian chapter of the global 
coalition anti-corruption Transparency International.   
In terms of organizational structure, most groups 
demonstrated fairly complex means of internal 
governance and selection of new leaders. Out of the four 
organizations that responded to this survey, three have the 
president elected by the general assembly or by the board. 
In only one case the president is not elected but is the 
founder of the organization, while the executive director 
is hired under contract. However this organization is not 
membership based. The organizations with an elected 
president had had at least one turnover of leadership, 
except one that has the same president since its founding. 
The average term of the presidents and the executive 
directors was of 3-4 year.  
The participatory structures used in this study as a 
proxy for the level of internal democratization present us 
with a mixed picture. On the one hand, two groups out of 
four ranked the general assembly or the ordinary 
members as the most important actors influencing the 
decisions of their organizations. Among the other two 
groups, one has a rather pro-expert attitude regarding 
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internal decision-making (experts are the most influential 
in the organization), while the other is not a membership-
based organization and ranked the director as the person 
with the highest influence on decisions.  
  In terms of membership, only one group 
approximates what can be called “community-based 
organization”, that is an organization mainly concerned to 
educate the citizens and work with community. This 
NGO is oriented toward civic education and participation 
and counts approximately 1200 members in 30 local 
branches spread throughout the country. The other groups 
have an average of 25 members and all of them use also 
volunteers although in a smaller number. In addition, all 
organizations have paid staff ranging from 5 to 16 full 
time employees. Usually, the staff is formed by experts in 
different fields, which are relatively well paid in 
comparison with the average salaries in Romania. 
Moreover, the groups tend to be elite based in terms of 
their leadership and staff. All of the leadership has a 
university education and most of them have also studied 
abroad especially in the USA and/or Western Europe. 
Furthermore, most of the staff has solid knowledge and 
expertise in the fields in which their organization works, 
and therefore these groups are highly professionalized 
ones.   
In general, scholars are particularly critical to such 
proffesionalized NGOs, and claim that these groups 
cannot play any representational role in their societies as 
they lack any mechanism of accountability to the citizens. 
The leaders of these organizations represent what Stubbs 
(1996) names the “globalised new professional middle 
class” which claims to act in the name of civil society but, 
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according to Stubbs is “no guarantee of progressive social 
change.” However, the groups analyzed here might not 
necessarily exemplify this pessimistic situation mentioned 
in the literature. While the rather shallow membership of 
these organizations may cast serious doubts about their 
capacity to mobilize the participation of the masses, it 
does not mean that they are less legitimate to advocate 
policies for the benefit of their societies. As it will be 
shown in the next chapter they claim to promote the 
interest of the broader public in general, and the 
disadvantaged categories of the society in particular. 
While critics are skeptical about professionalized NGOs’ 
capacity to voice the interest of people without being 
accountable to them, these groups seem to believe that an 
enlightened minority can advocate polices based on good 
research and knowledge of best practices, which will 
benefit the society as a whole. 
 
4.3 Sources of funding and assistance 
                                                                                                                                      
  This section examines the sources of founding and 
assistance, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of 
receiving foreign fund. The discussion below draws on 
the data provided by the four organizations that responded 
to the questionnaire. All four groups indicated that they 
are dependent on foreign funding for their activities, in an 
overwhelming proportion ranging from 95 percent to 100 
percent. In only in two cases, the fees for services 
provided by the organization accounted for 4 percent of 
the organization’s income, while members’ contributions 
and respectively donations from Romanian companies 
represented 1 percent. Moreover all four groups reported 
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an increase in their budget in the last 3-5 years. The 
ability to apply for grants and to write project related 
evaluations and reports for donors, (usually in English) 
seems to be a sine qua non condition for the existence of 
these groups.       
 Nevertheless, the international sources of funding 
are various. The organizations mentioned around 5 
different international sources, which provide them with 
funding annually. When asked which of these sources was 
the most important in 2004 some of them pointed to 
European donors others to American ones. However, only 
one group (TI-R) was dependent on a single donor in a 
significant proportion (80 percent of its 2004 total income 
came from only one source). For the other three, the most 
important donor in 2004 counted for less then 20% in two 
cases (APD and CJI) and between 20 and 40 percent in 
one case (SAR). These three latter cases might suggest a 
relative decisional autonomy of the organizations since 
there was no dominant single donor, which could dictate 
its own agenda.   
 The dependence on international funding is 
mainly due to the lack of domestic opportunities to 
receive funding for their activities There are several 
constraints that impede NGOs from obtaining funding 
from domestic sources. First of all the economic decline 
of the 1990s combined with a lack of philanthropic 
culture in Romania determined these organizations to 
search for funding abroad. Moreover, in the early 1990s, 
the state controlled an important part of the economic 
resources. Since the first NGOs emerged as watchdogs of 
democracy aiming to control the state power, the 
government regarded them as enemies and therefore it 
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rather tried to hinder their development than to fund them. 
In addition, even the existent domestic private donors are 
more interested in funding sports or cultural activities 
which assures them high visibility and publicity (see 
Dakova, 2000) than broad public interest agendas such as 
human rights, civic education and the environment.     
 Despite their dependence on foreign sources, 
many of the organizations surveyed here consider 
external funding as an advantage. Among the advantages, 
some organizations mentioned that receiving foreign 
funding “keeps you neutral and conserves your 
objectivity”. Other respondents noted that international 
funding helps the organization to have a certain degree of 
autonomy from the political and business sector: “It 
allows avoiding money with ‘strings attached’ (mainly 
politically) or tainted (coming from questionable business 
sources)” (Avadani, 2005, questionnaire). Besides direct 
funding through grants, many organizations also received 
technical assistance in the form of organizational 
development and management, advocacy methods, issue 
analysis. Most of them reported that international 
assistance has increased their capacity to advocate policy 
proposals on different issues. 
 However, NGOs mentioned that international 
funding has also its disadvantages. Some respondents 
stated that foreign funds do not always match the needs of 
their organizations. For instance, three groups reported 
that there were areas in which the organization wanted to 
work but could not because of a lack of international 
funding for that field. Moreover, one NGO pointed out 
that international grants provide insufficient support for 
the most important activities of the organization. Other 
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organizations mentioned the lack of funding for building 
organizational capacity, and explained that donor focus 
more on the sustainability of different projects than on 
developing sustainable organizations. “The international 
programs do not cover sufficiently the administrative 
costs. Most donors prefer to work with ‘established 
organizations’, but one cannot stay ‘established’ if not 
enough resources are allocated for such ‘trivial’ costs as 
rent and utilities” (Avadani, 2005, questionnaire).   
 
4.4 Relationships with other groups 
 
 This section discusses the relationship of the 
organizations with other groups and the degree of their 
embeddedness in the societal and political context. A 
controversial issue among the respondents of the 
questionnaire was whether international donors should 
support NGO coalitions or not. Two organizations 
actually reported that they have received international 
support for organizing advocacy coalitions to tackle 
particular issues with a broad front. On the other hand one 
respondent noted that this is not a realistic plan. 
“Coalitions are effective as long as they are spontaneous 
and they happen to be spontaneous if NGOs share the 
same interest with respect to limited number of issues. 
Competition among NGOs and different organizational 
interests impede long-term work together” (Zabava, 
2005, questionnaire).  
Despite these different opinions about voluntary 
or interest driven alliances, all organizations agreed that 
working together in a coalition increases their chances to 
successfully advocating certain issues. The respondents 
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mentioned several reasons for creating coalitions. First, 
coalitions gather several types of expertise, increasing the 
value of action. Second, they mobilize joint resources, 
contacts and levels of influence. Third, NGO leaders 
believe the more they are for an initiative, the more 
legitimate that initiative is.  Fourth, coalitions provide 
certain issues with more visibility and a better capacity to 
address all the stakeholders. However one respondent 
also identified some problems which arise from working 
in coalition. “Advocacy operations are cumbersome when 
too many organizations are involved. Difficulties appear 
when donor organizations involve in coalition work, 
because their grantees tend to follow in order to secure 
their financial interests, regardless of the issue to be 
advocated for” (Zabava, 2005, questionnaire). Despite 
these different opinions, all of the organizations have a 
good coalition experience since they were also part of 
other domestic NGO alliances besides FOIA. Moreover, 
they also participate in transnational NGO networks 
dealing with issues on their area of interest.   
In general, organizations declare to have good 
connection with other local groups and some of them 
seem to be somewhat well embedded in their political 
context. Most of the respondents openly acknowledged 
that some parties are more sympathetic to the position of 
their group then others. Moreover, two respondents 
mentioned that they often work to ensure the election of 
political leaders sympathetic to the goals of their 
organization. They also considered political parties as an 
efficient means to promote their policy proposals. By 
contrast, the respondents who claimed no sympathy for 
any party tended to believe that working with parties is 
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not an effective method to use in promoting the policies 
advocated by their organization.  
Most the organizations also reported increased 
contacts with the media. Usually they claim to benefit 
from good visibility on the media, especially at the 
national level. Since only one of them has local branches 
it seems that local media less discusses their activities. 
Most of the groups also reported increased contacts with 
the national government and local administration.  
 
4.5 Advocacy methods and style      
 
This section examines the advocacy methods and 
style of the NGOs, which participated in the FOIA 
coalition. The organizations discussed here engage in 
various activities to promote their goals. Sometimes the 
methods employed by one group overlap with those used 
by another, however in many cases they seem to be 
complementary.  As it will be shown in the next chapter, 
the variety of methods and styles as well as the ways in 
which they complement each other gave strength to the 
FOIA coalition.   
 The organizational structure of the groups seems 
to be connected with the type and style of their preferred 
advocacy activities. For instance, the organization that is 
more community based and has around 1200 members, is 
more ready to pressure the decision-makers “from 
below”, by mobilizing public opinion and disseminating 
information through the media. Moreover, this 
organization reported that it contacts more often the 
members of the parliament and the leaders of the parties 
than the civil servants or administrative agencies. The 
77
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
respondent from this organization pointed out that 
mobilizing public support for an issue is a good strategy 
for influencing decision-makers that directly depend on 
the vote of the citizens31.   
 Other organizations are more pro-expert based 
and therefore they argue that expertise on specific issues 
based on good research and knowledge of best practices is 
the most important to influence official decision-makers. 
Their approach is different from the one discussed above. 
These groups tend to contact more often the 
professionalized personnel of ministries and 
administrative agencies, which are more responsive to 
rather technical arguments than to direct pressures form 
public opinion. Therefore, these groups often publish 
research papers, policy analysis and recommendations, 
and reports based on monitoring the implementation of 
certain public policies. Moreover, some of them claim 
that personal links between people working in ministries 
and members of the organization are also very important.    
 Most of the groups mentioned that being part of a 
transnational network of organizations concerned about 
specific issues is influential. Being part of a transnational 
network is usually combined with a strategy based on 
good connections and lobby to international organizations 
to put pressure “from above” on domestic decision-
makers (i.e. governmental elites). Some respondents 
                                                          
31 Despite this optimistic view, the respondent from this 
organization mentioned that the FOIA campaign managed to 
mobilize only moderate support from the public opinion. However, 
the other organizations mentioned even less support, most of them 
indicating weak or very weak support. One of the groups even 
reported no support at all from public opinion for the FOIA 
coalition.    
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mentioned that such pressures “from above” are 
particularly efficient when the NGOs’ policy proposals 
coincide with the reform requirements for joining 
international organizations such as NATO or UE.  
 In contrast to the activities mentioned above, the 
organizations also pointed out several methods that are 
not part of their advocacy “repertoire”. For instance, most 
of the respondents emphasized that their organizations 
never engage in organizing demonstrations, protest 
strikes, or other direct actions. Only one organization that 
is more community based reported that it very rarely uses 
such methods to influence policy-making. Legal recourse 
to the courts or judicial bodies is also rather rarely used by 
the organization surveyed here. However, among the 
FOIA coalition members there is one exception in this 
regard, a human rights group that although did not 
respond to the questionnaire, is quite famous in Romania 
for suing the government both in national and 
international courts for infringing the basic rights and 
liberties of the citizens.     
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Summing up, all the participant organizations in 
the FOIA coalition collect an overwhelming proportion of 
their income from external sources. In addition, they are 
not mass based but rather elite organizations and most of 
their leaders and staff are highly educated professionals. 
While this does not necessarily render them illegitimate, it 
seems that these organizations are not the engines of 
mass-mobilization. However, mass based political 
participation is considerably more difficult to mobilize 
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around highly technical issues (such as human rights 
regulations, free access to public information, budget 
transparency, etc.) when benefits are not immediate but 
rather diffuse. In these cases, it is more probable that the 
pursuit of broad public goods would be the enterprise of 
highly professionalized civil society organizations, and 
more often with the support of external sources.  
Without claiming to represent the interest of one 
particular group or constituency, the groups analyzed here 
focus their activities on issues that benefit a broad cross-
section of the Romanian society. As it will be emphasized 
in the next chapter, these organizations are capable to 
work in a coalition, pool their resources and expertise 
together and advance policy proposals that address 
general issues of the Romanian society. The campaign for 
promoting free access to information in an underlying 
rights-based struggle that illustrates their potential.  
 
 
80
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
5. LIBERALIZING THE ACCESS TO PUBLIC 
INFORMATION IN ROMANIA:   THE ROLE OF 
ADVOCACY COALITION 
 
Having presented the impact of international 
assistance on the advocacy NGOs, I will turn now to 
discuss their role in liberalizing the access to public 
information in Romania. This chapter begins with a short 
conceptualization of advocacy coalitions and the 
mechanisms and strategies used by NGOs to influence 
policy outputs. Then I will move on to examine the 
arguments provided by the supporters of free access to 
information as a means to consolidate democracy in 
Romania. The following section points out the role of 
advocacy coalition in designing and adopting the 
Freedom of Information Act in Romania in 2001. 
Subsequently, I will analyze the participation of civil 
society in the implementation of this piece of legislation.     
Advocacy coalitions are defined as typical short-
term arrangements, which tend to be loosely structured 
and are motivated by concrete sets of objectives. 
Coalitions sometimes lack a formal or overt leadership, 
though individuals or main organizations may coordinate 
these types of alliances.   Advocacy coalitions increase the 
likelihood of successful participation in the policy, as by 
joining forces, groups generate a critical mass and 
improve their chances of being noticed by governing 
elites. Alliances can facilitate this process in at least three 
ways: creating a more efficient division of labor, 
bolstering their collective demands with greater numbers, 
and pooling resources. Their combined assets frequently 
include expertise, credibility, political and media contacts, 
international ties, administrative capacity, information, 
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ideas, and prior experience (Risley, 2004, pp. 9-10). 
Fig. 1 An NGO centered advocacy coalition framework for 
influencing policy outputs  
 
 In the model presented above, advocacy coalitions 
include not only domestic actors but also international 
ones. Three types of mechanisms for creating advocacy 
coalitions and mobilizing support for a certain policy are 
emphasized here. First, advocacy groups maintain a face-
to-face contact with executive branch officials, legislators, 
and other decision-makers, depending on where the 
policy is being created or its fate decided. Some types of 
resources NGOs have worked better in some institutions 
than in others. For instance solid technical analyses are 
more likely to influence administrative agencies or the 
courts than legislatures (Sabatier, 1999, p.143). In these 
cases NGOs’ capacity to directly persuade administrative 
and governmental officials is enhanced by their technical 
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and financial assistance provided by international donors. 
Professional advocacy groups are able to propose 
alternative policies based on good research, knowledge of 
best practice, and in addition they are usually trained in 
advocacy methods and ways of promoting their policy 
goals.  
Conversely, mobilizing support from the media 
and public opinion may be more influential with the 
legislative committees, and parliaments in general, than 
with an administrative agency (Sabatier, 1999, p.143). 
Although technical knowledge is also useful, the focus 
should be here on the second mechanism by which other 
influential domestic actors such as political parties, media, 
public opinion, intellectuals, etc. are mobilized.  
The third mechanism places the advocacy 
activities in their international context. Here it is argued 
that externally funded NGOs are more likely to develop 
links to International Organizations and participate in 
transnational NGO networks. By mobilizing relevant 
international actors, advocacy NGOs can put significant 
pressures on their government to introduce policies that 
are relatively unpopular among decision-makers. This 
mechanism is particularly relevant in countries that aspire 
to become members of international organizations such as 
the EU and NATO through the mechanism of 
conditionality that is compliance with certain conditions 
in order to obtain full membership. 
 
5.1 Why is free access to information important 
for democratic consolidation? 
 
Access to information may be defined as the 
ability of citizens to obtain information in the possession 
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of institutions, which are financed by public funds. Some 
states provide for access in their constitutions and laws; 
many do not. The basis for this type of legislation is every 
person’s right to solicit and receive information from all 
branches and levels of government. In a democratic 
regime information related to governmental actions and 
outputs should be public by definition and it encompasses 
not only laws or governmental acts, but also data on 
existing and proposed policies, public facilities, and 
public spending. In general scholars of democratization 
believe that access can render the processes of 
government more open and make those in power more 
accountable to their people (Diamond, 1999). However, 
access to information is not merely an abstract subject of 
academic debate. Lack of information hampers the least 
better off persons (the poor and the least educated 
members of a society) which cannot obtain the documents 
and information, which would enable them to claim their 
rights.  
Romanian activists and scholars who favor the 
legislation on free access to information advance further 
arguments about its importance.32 Their reasoning refers 
to the very essence of democracy in both its representative 
and participatory varieties. To begin with, access to 
information increases the capacity of civil society to 
monitor and control government actions. Moreover, 
                                                          
32 This discussion draws on questionnaire data and various 
documents that argue in favor of the FOIA legislation. For instance 
see: Transparency International Romania (2001); Mungiu-Pippidi 
(2002); Fartusnic & Iordache, (2001); Stefan, Laura; Ion 
Georgescu & Oana Zabava (2003); Vrabie, Codru, Zabava Oana 
(2002), Stan, Valerian; Toba, Monica & Popa, Raluca Maria 
(2004); etc.   
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citizens need information in order to participate 
meaningfully in open debates with public authorities on 
the issues that affect their interests. Therefore, access to 
information reduces the imbalance of power between the 
government and those governed, fostering a more 
“partnership” type of relation. In addition, citizens need 
information in order to select their representatives and 
monitor public servants to which they delegate power. 
Last but not least, access to information is essential to 
hold the government accountable as access to information 
induces some inhibitors in the bureaucratic behavior, 
discouraging to some degree the inefficiency, abuses and 
corruption of the public institutions.  
Accountability and responsiveness are issues that 
resonate broadly with Romanians. In surveys conducted 
during the 1990s, respondents consistently ranked 
corruption among the most worrisome problems plaguing 
their society. For instance, 86% of the respondents of a 
2001 survey cited by Romanian Academic Society33 
(SAR), say that all or almost all public servants are 
corrupt. Moreover, 87% believe that the Members of 
Parliament do not work for the public interest and 51 
percent thought that there is a conflict between citizens 
and the political class. In addition, 60 percent of the 
respondents reported that were mistreated by public 
servants and 67% recognized that they offered bribe in 
order to obtain their legal rights.  
In the last 15 years, the politicians and the 
political institutions such as the parliament and political 
                                                          
33 Romanian Academic society is a Romanian think tank founded 
in 1995. The study mentioned here is available in Romanian at: 
http://www.sar.org.ro/files_h/docs/advocacy_foia/3_prezentare.ppt 
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parties continued to rank very low in terms of Romanians’ 
trust34. In response to these negative trends, supporters of 
the freedom of information law have presented the reform 
as an opportunity for politicians to slow the dramatic 
descent in the polls35. Moreover, proponents of the reform 
argued that free access to information is a prerequisite of 
effective citizens’ participation in the democratic 
processes and the law will foster the capacity of 
individuals to make informed judgements about 
community matters.  
Romania had no regulation on free access to 
information until 2001, in spite of the fact that the right to 
information was already codified in the 1991 
Constitution. The Romanian Constitution of 1991 
provides in Article 31 that “any person’s right of access to 
information of public interest cannot be obstructed . . . 
The public authorities, according to their responsibilities, 
are obliged to ensure the correct information of citizens, 
with respect to public affairs and issues concerning 
personal interests.” In addition, the Constitution provides 
for the principle of priority of international human rights 
regulation to which Romania is part. For instance article 
19 of the Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the 
United Nations contains a formulation of the right to 
information as a twinning right to the freedom of 
                                                          
34 The most trusted institutions in Romania are the church (on 
average around 90%), the army (around 80%) and the media 
(between 60%-70%).  NGOs also score low in terms of 
populations’ trust (only around 30% of the Romanians trust them). 
35 See for instance Fartusnic & Iordache, (2001, p.15), who argue 
in a working paper (comparing the FOIAs in different European 
countries) that Romanian politicians might gain substantial 
political capital from the passage of the FOIA. 
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expression. Romania is also part of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and as a member of the 
European Council is compelled to respect the adopted 
documents of this organization including those on the 
freedom of information and expression. However, before 
2001, the access to information usually depended on the 
discretion of public authorities, which often rejected 
information requests. 
Despite all these international and constitutional 
commitments to openness made by the Romanian 
governments, most of the public officials have had a bad 
record concerning free access to information. During the 
1990s the rule was rather to hide information from the 
public than to make it available. In the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of communist regime in 1989, 
the first requests for access to information aimed to 
understand the totalitarian past and therefore mainly 
targeted the files of Ceausescu’s secret police, the 
infamous Securitate. However, faced with such requests 
from civil society organizations and the political 
opposition, the Romanian parliament dominated by 
communist successor parties, “rushed in 1991, before 
even the adoption of a new Constitution … to pass not a 
FOIA, but a National Security bill sealing the archives of 
Ceausescu’s secret service for 50 years” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2002, p.1).  
After the adoption of the new Constitution in 
1991 this tendency of keeping secrecy rather than 
fulfilling the constitutional right of free access to 
information continued. Moreover in 1993, four senators 
of the majority coalition proposed a draft on classified 
information. In its annual report of 1993, the Romanian 
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chapter of the International Helsinki Federation for 
Human Rights (known in Romania as the Association for 
the Defense of Human Rights - the Helsinki Committee, 
or APADOR-CH) characterized this draft as “the most 
serious legislative threat posed to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms after the downfall of the 
communist regime, expressing an intent to reinstate the 
police state, where any individual or activity have to be 
controlled” (Romanian Helsinki Committee, 1993). 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2002) reports that, the draft was 
lingering in the Parliament until 1999 when both 
Chambers approved it but in different versions. However, 
due to strong criticism from the media, authorities 
informally agreed to bury the draft in that stage until a 
FOIA will be passed.  
 
5.2 Phase one: designing and adopting the 
Freedom of Information Act 
 
In 2000, a liberal MP, Senator Eugen Vasiliu, 
initiated and promoted a draft law on access to 
information of public interest. However, according to 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2002) the draft was unpopular and 
criticized by the media as it contained a section on 
regulations against misinformation and libel through the 
media. Subsequently, Vasiliu improved the draft with the 
help of international expertise gathered by the Center for 
Independent Journalism (Bucharest), but he was still 
missing allies for his project. After the November 2000 
elections, another liberal MP, Deputy Mona Musca, 
assumed the Vasiliu draft law.    
On the other hand, when the Social Democratic 
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Party returned to power after the 2000 election, a final 
form of the previously “buried” bill on classified 
information was sent to the President for promulgation, 
covering both free and classified aspects of information 
access. Many members of civil society met this draft with 
consternation (World Bank, 2003). The definition of 
classified information was still left largely to the 
government’s discretion, and citizens were to be held 
responsible for guarding the secrets under serious penalty 
even if they came across such information by the most 
accidental means. This lack of clarity concerning the 
definition of classified information and rights and 
responsibilities regarding it was troubling both for internal 
and external critics. The internal context in which the 
debate between the supporters of the classified 
information bill and those of the free access to 
information draft took place in the early 2001 is 
suggestively described by a report of Transparency 
International Romania (2001, p. 3):   
 
“[After] a decade of legislative processes and public 
policies hostile to institutional transparency, the issue 
of access to information of public interest became 
gradually an important key word in the discourse of 
human rights organizations. While the topic gained its 
legitimization as a favorite of the civic activism, the 
idea of access to information of public interest made 
its way with more difficulty in the political and 
administrative discourse. It was perceived by most of 
the public officials, regardless of political affiliations, 
as a pressure tool in the hands of the media and civil 
society, when not considered a direct threat to state 
institutions.” 
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The liberalization of access to information cannot 
be properly understood without references to Romanian’s 
objectives of Euro-Atlantic integration36. NATO made 
demands on Romania to adopt clear regulations regarding 
access to information (together with the exception 
regarding military classified information) and 
transparency of the decision-making process. On the other 
hand, the EU’s demands were even more complex than 
NATO’s, and the process of negotiating accession 
chapters led Romania towards adopting similar 
mechanisms with other member states, within a very short 
time span.  
Therefore, both the supporters of the free access to 
information draft and those of classified information draft 
justified their bills as required by Romania’s joining 
NATO and the EU. While the government claimed that 
the law on classified information is a requirement for 
Romania’s joining NATO, the opponents argued that the 
North-Atlantic Organization was concerned only with 
military information and not with the governmental 
secrets. On the other hand, supporters of FOIA pointed to 
the EU’s regular reports on Romania, which critically 
mentioned the absence of a freedom of information act as 
a means for improving the accountability of government 
and fight against corruption37. 
                                                          
36 Romania joined NATO in 2002. In April 2005 Romania signed 
the Treaty of Accession with the EU, and is scheduled to join the 
Union in 2007. 
37 See for instance Commission of the European Communities, 
(2001): Regular report on Romania’s progress towards accession-
2001, p.22, available at: 
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Moreover, local and international critics expressed 
concern that the legislation proposed by the government 
focused on restrictions of access to classified information, 
when the thrust should be freedom of access to 
information. Civil society groups, the media and some 
political parties strongly opposed the classified 
information bill. The international and national context 
was such that the Romanian government could ill afford a 
scandal. According to Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p. 2) the 
decisive event for countering the Government’s initiative 
on classified information was “a ruling of the 
Constitutional Court, which on procedural rather than 
substantive grounds declared the bill ‘unconstitutional’ 
and won more time for the nascent coalition opposing it. 
After this event, the President and the Prime Minister 
changed strategy overnight, dissociated themselves 
moderately from the initiators of the draft and agreed it 
should be put on hold until a FOIA was passed to create a 
general regulatory framework of access to information”. 
Hence, the social-democrat government aimed to 
counter the liberals’ advantage of having a draft on free 
access of information and the Ministry of Public 
Information (MPI) produced and advanced surprisingly 
fast its own draft “in no way worse than the Liberals’ 
one”38. On the other hand, the liberals refused to give up 
their advantage of having already a draft in the process 
and announced that they will block the governments draft 
and advance their own. Civil society organizations 
                                                                                                            
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/imgupload/2001_Regular_Report.
pdf 
38 Evaluation made by Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p.2). For a 
comparative analysis of the two drafts and other European 
regulations on FOIA, see also Fartusnic & Iordache, (2001). 
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thought it was the right moment to step in the process and 
mediate between the two parts and, at the same time 
substantially improve the FOIA drafts. In this sense, the 
Romanian Academic Society (SAR) produced and 
disseminated a working paper reviewing both the liberals’ 
project and the government’s one and published the 
Slovak law as a model worth following. According to 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p.8) this working paper was 
conceived as an advocacy instrument as well as an 
awareness raising tool.  
Subsequently, the Romanian Academic Society 
(SAR) provided a neutral ground for the supporters of the 
two drafts to meet, discuss their views and agree upon 
principles and phrasing. “The meeting started at about 
lunch time on Friday, March 23 and by the end of normal 
office hours a civil society coalition was forged behind a 
new version of the FOIA, both the liberals and the 
government were won for the new version and they had in 
the same time agreed among themselves a procedure to 
bridge the conflict” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p.2). The new 
version agreed at SAR’s headquarters included many 
points from the liberal draft, the government’s draft and 
also incorporated many articles put forward by the civil 
society organizations which attended the meeting.  
Amendments proposed by civil society and the 
media associations to the draft included for instance the 
provision of administrative responsibility, namely the 
right of persons to appeal at a superior instance in the 
same agency if the entitled information was not provided 
according to the law. Civil society organizations 
considered this provision important, as most of the 
citizens do not have the means and time to sue the 
respective agency in the court. Moreover, the new draft 
92
             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
provided that every institution should create a specialized 
office and appoint a person dealing with information 
requests and the publishing of ex officio information 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p.8). In addition the League of 
Romanian Journalists backed by the Center for 
Independent Journalism, requested that the information 
for journalists should be disclosed immediately or in 
maximum 24 hours. The Romanian Helsinki Committee 
(APADOR-CH) was concerned mainly to reduce the 
number of exceptions from FOIA and secure the status of 
framework law for the regulation in order to annihilate the 
possible negative effects of the future law on classified 
information. Other Romanian NGOs involved included 
the Media Monitoring Agency and Transparency 
International Romania. International partners of these 
NGOs, such as the UK based organization Article 19, 
were also active in providing legal counsel to their 
Romanian partners on the FOIA drafts. The politicians 
who participated at the SAR meeting were the liberal MP, 
Mona Musca, member of the media committee of the 
Chamber of Deputies together with Eugen Vasiliu, author 
of the liberal draft, and the MIP Secretary of State, Dan 
Jurcan, author of the government’s draft (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2002, p. 9). 
At the end of the meeting civil society 
organizations signed a statement by which they agreed to 
form a coalition to promote the adoption and 
implementation of the FOIA. According to Mungiu-
Pippidi (2002, pp. 9-10) the statement contained also an 
actual threat “that the civil society would not rest but 
create a stir in the domestic and foreign media, as well as 
at the level of international instances if the law did not 
turn out in the form agreed. It showed the decision of 
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civil society to act as a block and addressed directly the 
main concern of the government party in that moment, 
the international public opinion. And so it worked.” Other 
participants to the FOIA coalition also acknowledged the 
importance of international pressure as a tool for 
advancing their policy proposals. Referring to EU 
conditionality, Avadani39 (2003) claims that “EU ‘acquis 
communautaire’ works as a marvel when it comes to 
promote advanced standards in legislation”. Although 
there are no specific FOIA conditions for joining the EU, 
the European Commission constantly criticized Romania 
in its country reports for the lack of such legislation40. 
Another civil society organization leader considered that 
“NGOs can take advantage of external pressure to 
promote change” (Zabava, 2005, questionnaire).  
 After the meeting at SAR, the media commission 
of the Chamber of Deputies synthesized the liberal and the 
government’s proposals into only one draft based on the 
agreements mentioned above. NGO representatives 
attended again the meetings in the Parliament and pushed 
for "maximal openness" principle and contributed even to 
the wording for the law (Avadani, 2003, p.2). According 
to one NGO leader:  
 
“Participating in the work of the commissions 
allowed us to send the message directly, without 
                                                          
39 Ioana Avadani is director of the Center for Independent 
Journalism, an organization which is part of the FOIA coalition. 
40 See for instance Commission of the European Communities, 
(2001): Regular report on Romania’s progress towards accession-
2001, p.22, available at: 
http://www.infoeuropa.ro/ieweb/imgupload/2001_Regular_Report.
pdf 
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possible misinterpretations and with the possibility to 
use our ‘public speaking skills’ to persuade the 
members. It also created a ‘subjective majority’, which 
influenced the vote in the commissions. Our physical 
presence in the meetings ‘forced’ the policy-makers to 
save face and prevented them to vote against 
something they claimed they respected” (Avadani, 
2005, questionnaire). 
 
By the summer 2001, both chambers of the 
Parliament passed the FOIA and by the end of the year 
the law was successfully enacted. In July, the Romanian 
Academic Society sent a wake-up call email message to a 
dozen development donor groups, stating in effect that the 
FOIA bill was by then in a fairly advanced stage and any 
input from these organizations would have to be delivered 
in a timely fashion to be effective (World Bank, 200). The 
message energized USAID Romania’s Democracy and 
Governance group to become involved by lending the 
services of its contractor, the IRIS Center. Although the 
IRIS project in Romania focused largely on business 
environment issues, IRIS had broader regional experience 
with the freedom of information act implementation that 
recommended them for assistance to the FOIA coalition 
in Romania. Regional experience of FOIA best practices 
was also important for designing the law41. For instance 
according to Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p.10) at the meeting 
at SAR, at some point an article from the Slovak FOIA 
was translated from English into Romanian and included 
directly into the civil society’s recommendations list. 
                                                          
41 Bulgaria has passed a FOIA in 1999, and Slovakia in 2000. 
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The alliance forged after the meeting at SAR was a 
coalesced informal coalition. The core contributors were 
NGOs dedicated to transparency, citizen participation, 
political reform, human rights, and journalists 
associations, which pooled together their diverse expertise 
and various contacts, both in the country and abroad. 
According to Ioana Avadani, leader of the Center for 
Independent Journalism Romania who participated in the 
FOIA coalition:  
 
    “The key word in this structure was ‘informal’: the 
participant NGOs joined one or another of the activities 
according to their own agenda and availability, there 
was no "leadership" or subordination. But the informal 
character of the coalition was, at the same time, the 
strength and the soft belly of the coalition. 
    The strength - because it allowed for flexibility, for 
fluent, direct and timely communication (sometimes at 
night, on personal phones) and for speedy reaction, 
avoiding all kinds of meetings, formal consultations or 
vote procedures. Each of the members took the lead 
when their field of expertise was more relevant and 
there were not cases of disputes over ‘who's the boss’. 
    The weakness - because the coalition had no distinct 
individuality or ‘brand’ and sometimes the public 
perception failed to recognize the group of NGOs as a 
single entity” (Avadani, 2003, p. 2). 
 
The strategies used by the members of the coalition 
were manifold. They met directly the lawmakers in the 
parliament and the governmental officials who drafted the 
law. They also organized conferences and seminars, 
exchanged research and technical information and used 
the media to raise awareness among governmental and 
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civil society actors, as well as the broader public. At one 
time or another during the campaign, different groups 
took lead depending on their area of expertise.   
The contacts with individual officials, MPs or 
government officials, were important for advancing the 
policy proposals. One leader of a participant NGO argues 
that the success of the advocacy process was mainly 
facilitated by the degree to which some lawmakers and 
public servants were sympathetic or interested in the 
passage of FOIA: “individuals' commitment mattered; the 
most active officials were those who assessed FOIA as 
important for their own political or administrative career" 
(Zabava, 2005, questionnaire). The personal experience 
and training of the officials was also important. According 
to a World Bank report (2003, p. 93) in order to help the 
Romanian government gain a clearer sense of how FOIA 
is implemented in the U.S., “two study tours to the U.S.  
were  organized  for  MPI  officials  with  support  from  
the  U.S.  Embassy and the International Republican 
Institute”. Mungiu-Pippidi (2002, p. 14, note no. 9) also 
remarks that the expert within the Ministry of Public 
Information (MPI) who drafted the government’s project 
“had been shipped to the U.S. by USAID just weeks 
before”. Therefore, some NGO leaders saw the adoption 
of the FOIA as a result of the efforts of an “enlightened” 
elite, which shares a westernized cultural model of 
freedom distinct from the broad society. The description 
made by one of the leaders, which participated in the 
FOIA coalition, is illustrative in this sense:  
 
What makes the still unfinished story of FOIA a 
breakthrough is a mix of various elements. First we 
have a small group of Western-educated intellectuals, 
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mostly with an American background or belonging to 
American-sponsored Romanian NGOs able to work 
together and put forward a project drawing on a 
cultural model of freedom shared by this group, but on 
behalf of the society as a whole. In so doing they also 
act to mobilize other actors as well, under the banner of 
self-interest this time, actors enjoying considerable 
influence, such as political parties or journalists’ 
associations. They are then able to take advantage of 
circumstances by acting promptly on the basis of good 
research, knowledge of best practices, good leadership 
and mutual trust relations. Similar actors can reproduce 
every one and each of those in any other similar 
society. (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p.14) 
 
Even if the passing of the law went smoothly, the 
process posed some problems. Although Romanians rank 
corruption as one of the most worrisome problems 
plaguing their society, many of them seemed to be 
unaware that free access to information could be used as a 
tool for countering it. Accordingly, most of the 
respondents to my questionnaire mentioned that the FOIA 
coalition secured only a very weak support from public 
opinion. For instance, one NGO leader asserts that “there 
was no social expectation [bold in original] for such a 
law and, as a result, no pressure from the society. In a 
way, we were in the avant-garde, ‘forcing’ the law onto 
the Romanian society” (Avadani, 2003, p. 3). This does 
not mean that the law is useless. By contrast it indicates a 
gap between citizens’ perception of problems (such as 
corruption and lack of governmental accountability) and 
the possible solutions for them. It is not surprising that 
citizens who lived for almost half a century in a 
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totalitarian regime promoting a culture of secrecy do not 
know how access to information can be helpful for them. 
Even after the collapse of communism they are still 
habituated to solve problems in the old fashion (i.e. 
patronage, clientelims, bribe, etc.). The adoption of the 
law is a step forward to remedy this situation. However 
the success of the FOIA in producing the intended effects, 
depends on the level of citizens information about their 
rights and the modalities to turn to a good account these 
rights. In this sense, the role of the civil society and the 
media to educate and provide citizens with the necessary 
information is of crucial importance.  
In general, all participant civil society 
organizations expressed their satisfaction with their 
involvement in the policy-making of FOIA. They 
considered that the adoption of FOIA sets out a good 
precedent for the civil society’s involvement in policy-
making. For instance one NGO leader noted that: 
 
 “The drafting, refining and passing of the Romanian 
FOIA was an excellent exercise of cooperation 
between government, political parties and civil 
society. It was for the first time when a group of 
NGOs was involved in the law making process, form 
the very beginning. Their role was crucial and their 
impact is acknowledged by all the key players. The 
NGOs provided advice to the authors of the draft, 
provided international critique to the various versions 
of the text and created a certain degree of media 
awareness regarding the problems of freedom of 
information” (Avadani, 2003, p.2). 
  
On its turn, the Government presented the 
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adoption of FOIA in October 2001 as “major shift from 
opacity to transparency in the activity of public 
authorities, and from non-involvement to direct 
participation of citizens” in decision making (Romanian 
Government, 2005). Beside this symbolic significance 
attached to the FOIA, the law42 actually contains 
provisions that create the mechanisms for empowering 
citizens in their relation with the government. To begin 
with, the law allows for all persons to have access to 
information of public interest - meaning information in 
the possession, regarding or generated by public 
institutions (entities using public money and being active 
on Romanian soil). Exceptions from the free access are 
listed43. The law states the obligations of the public 
authorities and institutions concerning the release - ex 
officio or by request - of the information, as well as the 
procedures and the deadlines for releasing the 
information. The public authorities and institutions are 
required to create special departments for public 
information.  
A special chapter is dedicated to the media and 
journalists’ access to information. The authorities and the 
public institutions are required to create specialized 
structures for their relations with the media. The media 
outlets are subject to positive discrimination, as the 
deadline for the release of information to them is 24 hours, 
compared to 10 days for ordinary requests. Those who 
                                                          
42 The law is available online in Romanian on the web site of the 
Romanian Parliament: 
http://www.cdep.ro/pls/legis/legis_pck.htp_act_text?idt=30060  
43 Law no 182/2002 concerning classified information mentions 
some of the documents that are excepted from free access to public 
information. 
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consider that their rights to freely access the information 
have been breached - either by denial of the information or 
by failure of meeting the deadlines - can appeal the 
decision, first by administrative way (to the superior of the 
employee who has denied the information), then to the 
court.  The court can rule in favor of the disclosure of the 
information and can also sentence the public institution to 
moral or patrimonial damages.  
 
5.3 Phase two: implementing the Law on free 
access to public information  
 
After lobbying for the adoption of the FOIA, the 
advocacy coalition moved on to monitor the 
implementation of the law. During the talks on 
implementation, new NGOs have stepped into the 
process but they agreed that opinions on implementation 
should not be sent individually to the government but 
discussed and put forward strongly by the coalition 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2002, p.10). The members of the 
coalition continued to work with the Ministry of Public 
Information (MPI) on the implementation norms of the 
FOIA44. “Based on the good exercise we had with the 
law itself, we persuaded MPI to continue consultation 
during the drafting and the adoption of the 
[implementation] norms” (Avadani, 2003, pp.3-4).   
Mungiu-Pippidi (2002), president of SAR, 
proposed a strategy for the implementation of FOIA as a 
two-stage process: first empowering the government, 
and second empowering the community in the 
                                                          
44 The norms of implementation have been published in the official 
Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 167 of March 8, 2002. 
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accountability process. According to this strategy the 
first need that arises from FOIA is to build the capacity 
of the newly created PR offices. It was for the first time 
when the law stipulated the creation of such offices, and 
due to lack of experience and skills it was improbable 
that the staff of public institutions could effectively fulfil 
their duties45. After building the capacity of institutions, 
the strategy suggests to bring in the consumer that is 
empowering the community (citizens and NGOs). 
However, keeping the institutions accountable may 
require the reading of somewhat technical information 
such as the spending report and the budgets. Therefore, 
Mungiu-Pippidi argues that, until the citizens acquire the 
necessary skills and habituation, a competent and 
independent intermediate agent is needed to act on 
behalf of the public. The solution proposed by Mungiu-
Pippidi is to empower the local NGOs or other 
community organizations to act as auditor or 
Ombudsmen of the citizens. In the first years after the 
passage of the law, these organizations should check 
reports and help individuals to fill complaints.  
 Consequently the FOIA coalition further 
participated not only by monitoring public institutions 
but also by actively supporting the implementation. The 
members of the coalition prepared projects funded 
mainly by foreign donors and aimed at training public 
information officers, journalists, lawyers, and 
magistrates regarding the implementation of FOIA. In 
addition, members of the coalition carried out training 
                                                          
45 Moreover, According to Mungiu-Pippidi wages in the public 
sector were about the national average, that is approximately 100 
USD per month, and therefore persons with PR skills preferred to 
work in the media or in the PR offices of private businesses.  
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session, seminars, research, conferences and projects 
aimed to improve the implementation of FOIA46. These 
were carried out sometimes in partnership with the 
government. For instance, Pro Democracy Association 
(APD) carried out a project aimed to empower civil 
society to facilitate the interaction between citizens and 
public institutions under FOIA. The project’s initiators 
also planed to promote public awareness, collect and 
disseminate public information, provide assistance and 
training to public institutions. For achieving these goals, 
APD created a network of FOIA Resource Centers 
involving its local branches to effectively interact with 
public agencies, under the provisions of the FOIA.  The 
project was implemented in partnership with the Ministry 
of Public Information, and the United Nations 
Development Program funded it. Moreover, APD also 
organized a series of training sessions for the persons 
working in the newly created FOIA Resource Centers.   
                                                          
46 Without the claim of exhaustively presenting all the activities 
carried out by the coalition members I will just provide some 
examples. SAR realized and published a guide of FOIA best 
practices financially supported by USAID. Transparency 
International Romania published a guide for citizens regarding 
FOIA financed by USAID and America’s Development 
Foundation. Moreover, Transparency International Romania has 
realized a project "The People's Advocate and the European 
Ombudsman—guarantors of transparency in Romania and the 
European Union". The European Union through the PHARE 
Program funded this project. The Romanian chapter of the 
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH) together with the Center for 
Independent Journalism and the international organization Article 
19 organized an International conference on FOIA issues. Most of 
these organizations also organized training sessions for public 
servants, journalists, and civil society organizations. 
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 Most of the members of the FOIA coalition 
monitored and published reports on the implementation of 
the law. The Institute for Public Policies realized, with the 
financial support of the Canadian Embassy in Bucharest, 
one of the most recent studies concerning FOIA47. The 
research points out the stage of the implementation of 
FOIA, at the local level, three years after the law has been 
enacted. The study reports that, on the part of citizens 
there is only a gradual increase in the number of 
information requests based on the FOIA, which suggests 
that citizens’ interest and participation is still under the 
expectations of the supporters of the law. Three yeas after 
the law has been passed only small part of the population 
seems to have learned about the law. On the part of the 
public institutions, most local government institutions 
(around 75%) have established the department 
responsible for the implementation of the FOIA. However 
there are still problems which impede the efficient 
implementation of the law due to the lack of skilled 
personnel and proper material endowments of public 
administration. Compared with previous NGO reports on 
the FOIA (from 2002, 2003), which were even more 
pessimistic, this latter study points to a slight 
improvement in the implementation of the law. This 
might suggest that it takes time for both the institutions 
and citizens to adapt and make proper use of the tools 
provided by the law.   
                                                          
47 The study was published in September 2004. For details see Stan 
et all (2004).  
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
The activity of the FOIA coalition suggests an 
increased participation of externally funded NGOs in 
policy-making. This case supports the argument 
(mentioned in chapter three) that once the authorities 
become more committed to Euro-Atlantic integration, the 
voice of professionalized NGOs starts to count more. 
According to an NGO leader “after 10 years of trial and 
error, yet benefiting from the constant and coherent 
assistance of external donors, the Romanian civil society 
managed to reach the ‘critical mass’ necessary for getting 
involved into the governmental process from a 
constructive perspective, now offering also solutions and 
not only scattered criticism.48” As pointed out by one of 
the participants, the adoption of the FOIA was advocated 
by a small group of western educated NGO professionals. 
But on the other hand, the broader public was not 
involved in the story of FOIA. Even after the act has been 
adopted, citizens remained somehow ignorant on how to 
make use of their rights provided by the law.   
Nevertheless, the advocacy NGOs managed to 
successfully “link-up” to the decision-makers and 
promote the law. Moreover, the FOIA coalition advanced 
its goals by skillfully using both the internal pressures of 
media, on the one hand and the external pressure of the 
EU and NATO integration’s exigencies, on the other. The 
coalition’s experience exemplifies several of the benefits 
of forming alliances proposed at the outset of this chapter. 
                                                          
48 See Popa, Marian V., president of Transparency International 
Romania, Foreword  in Vrabie, Codru; Zabava Oana (2002, p. 5)     
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Making similar demands separately from one another 
seemed like a recipe for political marginalization. Instead, 
the strategy of joining forces created a critical mass and a 
common voice used to sway the authorities. The NGOs 
coordinated their activities, enjoyed a good division of 
labor based on their respective specialties (such as legal, 
political, administrative and journalistic experience), and 
pooled resources (including access to international 
organizations and transnational NGOs, domestic 
politicians and the media).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This book analyzed the impact of international 
assistance on the participation of civil society in policy-
making processes. I have argued that citizens’ 
participation in decision-making through civil society 
organizations is key to democratic consolidation as it 
increases the accountability, responsiveness and 
legitimacy of democratic regimes. Moreover it has been 
shown that international assistance has a mixed effect on 
the contribution of civil society to the consolidation of 
democracy in Romania. On the one hand, foreign aid 
enhances the capacity of civil society to mobilize 
advocacy coalitions and this in turn increases their 
chances to successfully influence policies. But on the 
other hand, democracy assistance fosters professionalized 
elite dominated groups that are detached from their 
domestic constituencies. In other words, the book 
demonstrated that foreign assistance fosters NGOs’ “link 
up” to the policymakers while in the same time hinders 
their “link down” to the citizens and the community. This 
has been tested by conducting an empirical analysis based 
on questionnaire data regarding the organizations that 
advocated for the liberalization of access to information in 
Romania. 
As emphasized by the analysis conducted in 
chapter five of the book, the campaign for promoting free 
access to information in an underlying rights-based 
struggle that illustrates the potential of advocacy NGOs to 
influence policy outputs. All the participant organizations 
in the FOIA coalition collect an overwhelmingly 
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proportion of their income from external sources. Related 
to this dependence on foreign grants, critics of democracy 
assistance have pointed out that hash competition for 
funds impedes any form of cooperation between NGOs. 
In contrast to this claim, the groups analyzed here proved 
to be capable to work in a coalition, pool their expertise 
together and advance policy proposals that address 
general issues of the Romanian society. They managed to 
coordinate their advocacy activities skillfully, enjoyed a 
good division of labor based on their respective specialties 
(such as legal, political, administrative and journalistic 
experience), and pooled resources (including access to 
international organizations, transnational NGO networks, 
domestic politicians and the media).   
However, drawing on the analysis of Romanian 
policymaking process presented in chapter three, I argue 
that the impact of international assistance on civil 
society’s involvement in policy-making depends on the 
level of a country’s integration into the international 
community. Therefore, in the early stages of transition, 
when Romania was rather isolated and had weak ties with 
consolidated democracies and their norms and practices, 
the outcomes of democracy assistance were rather 
shallow. The communist successor authorities 
marginalized the newly emerged NGOs and dismissed 
them as illegitimate partners in policy-making. However, 
gradually when democracy started to consolidate and the 
Romanian governments made firm commitments to Euro-
Atlantic integration (i.e. NATO and UE), externally 
funded NGOs became an increasingly important voice in 
influencing policies and pushing for a neo-liberal agenda. 
These findings seem to confirm Carothers’ (1996, p.127) 
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analogy according to which democracy assistance appears 
to “work best as an additional fuel in the tank of an 
already moving car; it cannot very easily fill an empty 
tank or serve as a replacement motor for a stalled 
vehicle.” In other words the positive influence of 
democracy assistance on civil society’s participation in 
policy-making increases when there is an initial impetus 
for openness and reform on the part of authorities. Despite 
these uneven effects, the contribution of international 
assistance to the emergence and development of civil 
society in Romanian cannot be disregarded. As pointed 
out in chapter two, a significant part of the funding for the 
NGO sector comes from foreign sources.    
Nevertheless, international funding has fostered a 
certain type of civil society, which is typified in many 
aspects by the cases discussed in this book. The groups 
analyzed here are not mass based but rather elite 
organizations and this challenges donors’ assumption that 
such groups can increase citizens’ participation in public 
affairs. While their elite character does not necessarily 
render them illegitimate, it questions the capacity of these 
organizations to act as engines of mass-mobilization. As 
pointed out in chapter four of the book, most of them have 
shallow membership while their leaders and staff are 
highly educated professionals. In addition, their leadership 
nicely illustrates what Stubbs (1996) called “the new 
global professionalized middle class” who has few ties to 
the grassroots and is a creation of the “growth industry of 
democracy promotion and protection”. Many of the staff 
and leaders of these groups adapt to the norms and values 
of their donors and share the global perspective. That is, 
most of them assume a westernized cultural model, and 
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have experience studying or working abroad, good 
connections with foreign donors and international 
organizations and English language skills.  
The ability to apply for grants and to write project 
related evaluations and reports for donors, (usually in 
English) seems to be a sine qua non condition for the 
existence of these groups. Consequently, the NGOs 
discussed here are less open to ordinary people. 
Moreover, some of them reported that most of the foreign 
grants cover only project-related costs and do not provide 
resources for organizational building or for day to day 
running costs. As a result, these NGOs have to constantly 
work on writing project proposals in order to secure their 
existence, and this in turn might divert their energy from 
activities such as building up a constituency and 
increasing membership. Therefore, they often seem to be 
more beholden to international donors than to the larger 
public whose interest they claim to represent. 
The issue of representation is important as it 
points to the legitimacy of these groups to act as link 
between the people and the government and influence 
policy-making on behalf of the citizens. Critics of 
democracy assistance to civil society are dismissive of 
any representative role for the professionalized advocacy 
NGOs. Moreover, scholars often see these groups as 
executing agents of the neo-liberal agenda of their donors, 
thus having practically no autonomy. In spite of the truth 
in some of the criticism mentioned above, the groups that 
formed the FOIA coalition do not necessarily illustrate 
this pessimistic point of view mentioned in the literature. 
Although their existence almost exclusively depends on 
international funding, for most of them the sources of 
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funding are dispersed among a number of donors (public 
and private) from several countries. In this case, no 
established democracy or donor organization is in a 
position to dictate an agenda, and the loss of one large 
grant does not necessarily threaten the survival of the 
organization. This in turn might render them with a 
certain degree of autonomy. 
 Without claiming to represent the interest of one 
particular domestic group or constituency, the groups 
analyzed here focus their activities on issues that benefit a 
broad cross-section of the Romanian society. Eventually, 
liberalizing access to public information represents an 
underlying right-based struggle. Freedom of information 
is a foundational element of participatory democracy as 
well as an instrument for citizens to meet basic needs. It is 
also a tool to fight against the high level of corruption and 
low level of accountability, which are issues that broadly 
resonate among Romanians. Therefore, professionalized 
civil society groups such as those analyzed in this book, 
may not be the driving force that mobilize people into 
mass participation, but still they can play a valuable role 
for the citizens by advocating policies that will benefit the 
society as a whole.  
Nevertheless, the campaign for liberalizing access 
to information in Romania also suggest, that these groups 
are better prepared to do what donor trained and funded 
them to do, namely advocacy targeting decision-making, 
rather than to educate the community and especially the 
less educated among its members. The Freedom of 
Information Act in Romania has been initiated and 
promoted by a small group of elite dominated NGOs, 
enlightened politicians, and government officials, which 
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shared a common cultural model of freedom based on 
their westernized experience and background. This group 
then used external pressure and mobilized other internal 
actors to determine the more reluctant decision-makers to 
adopt the law. However, what has been missing from the 
story of liberalizing access to information outlined above 
is the support from the presumptive beneficiaries of the 
law, namely ordinary people. All the respondents to my 
questionnaire acknowledged that public opinion and 
citizens provided very weak support for the FOIA 
campaign. In addition, four years after liberalizing access 
to information the broader public seems to remain 
somehow ignorant about how to make use of the rights 
provided by the law. 
On a more general level, the case study conducted 
in this book also points to a distressful conclusion 
regarding the international neo-liberal agenda in general 
and democracy assistance in particular. It reveals that 
aiding democracy abroad carries with it the risk to 
promote an elitist type of democracy. That is, the neo-
liberal model of democratic institutions and policies are 
transferred and implemented in recipient countries with 
the contribution of a small set of local elites with few 
incentives to develop ties to the grassroots and stimulate 
citizens’ involvement. Consequently, the larger society 
remains somewhat alienated from the new institutions and 
participation in policy-making processes. Again, the result 
might be the promotion of a shallow type of democracy 
based on purely formal criteria, which does not reflect the 
societal penetration of democratic habits and values 
necessary for the successful consolidation of democracy.  
However, the findings of this research do not 
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suggest that foreign funds should be cut and democracy 
assistance should be stopped because they somehow 
hinder NGOs’ “link down” to their community. I argued 
that consolidation of democracy is a continuous process, 
which not only implies voters’ participation in elections 
but also necessarily requires maximizing citizens’ 
opportunities to influence the conditions in which they 
live. From this perspective, the study suggests that in 
order to effectively promote democratic consolidation 
international donors would need to create the incentives 
for civil society groups to work more with the citizens, to 
educate and empower them to make informed political 
choices and meaningfully participate in the governance of 
their community.  
This book has made a threefold contribution to the 
academic literature on democratization. First, on a more 
general level, it has linked together three strands of an 
argument that has as yet been insufficiently connected: 
consolidation of democracy, civil society and democracy 
assistance. Second, it has contributed to the academic 
debate on the impact of international assistance on civil 
society by empirically testing the effects of foreign aid in 
a novel perspective focusing not only on the structure of 
NGOs, but also on how these organizations perform their 
ideational functions attributed to them by democratic 
theory. Finally, the book provided a case study on the 
evolution of civil society and its contribution to 
democratization in Romania, which adds to the scarce 
amount of research about this country’s associational life.        
Future research could expand the scope of this 
study in several directions. First in order to understand 
better the impact of international assistance on the 
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contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation 
future research could compare civil society organisations 
that have received foreign assistance with those that were 
relying on domestic funding alone. Second, further 
research could be based on the comparative analysis of 
more countries in order to reveal the influences of the 
international support for the NGO sectors in different 
contexts. Conversely, it might differentiate between 
different donors’ strategies and compare their 
effectiveness in the same context. Besides these possible 
directions on analysis, in general, more research is needed 
to explain the influence of international factors on the 
citizens-government nexus and particularly on citizens’ 
participation in policy-making in new democracies. I 
believe that this area of inquiry is crucial for our 
understanding of democratic consolidation.  
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APPENDIX A – THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
This questionnaire is very easy to fill out. Please read the 
questions that follow below. If given the option of a list of 
various answers, choose the answer that best represents 
your view. Otherwise, please write the answer 
immediately after the question. Use as much space as 
you need for answering the questions. If you do not 
want to answer a particular question, you may simply 
move to the next one. You may also provide additional 
information that is not covered by the questions at the 
end of this questionnaire. Individual answers to the 
questionnaire are completely confidential.  
 
 
1. What is the official name of your organization? 
2. Please write the month and year when your group 
was founded? 
3.a. Is your organization part of a national coalition, 
alliance, “umbrella organization”, forum or federation? (If 
yes, please specify) 
3.b. Is your organization part of an international coalition, 
alliance, “umbrella organization”, forum or federation? (If 
yes, please specify) 
 
The following section of the questionnaire asks 
questions about the membership and leadership of your 
organization. 
 
4. About how many members do you have in your 
organization? 
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5. What was your membership five years ago (if 
applicable)? 
a. Larger than current size 
b. Approximately the same as today  
c. Smaller than current size 
6. How many volunteers does your organization have? 
7.  Does your organization have any paid staff? 
a. If yes, how many are full time employees? 
b. If yes, how many are part-time paid 
employees? 
8. Can you please rank the following 7 items from 1 to 7 
on the basis of their effect on decisions of your 
organization? [N.B. 1. Stands for the most important, and 
7. Stands for the least important, Please indicate if one of 
the following items is not applicable to your 
organization.] 
a. Conference/General meeting of members or 
delegates  
b. The “Umbrella Group” 
c. The executive committee of your organization 
d. President/director of the organization 
e. Local branches  
f. The experts of your organization 
g. Ordinary members 
9. Is the president/[director] of your organization elected? 
If yes, how? 
10. How many presidents/[directors] have led your 
organization since its founding? 
11. How long has the current president/[director] served in 
his or her position? 
12. Have you or one of your organization’s leaders worked 
or studied abroad? (If yes please specify when and 
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where) 
The following section of this questionnaire asks about the 
activities of your group. 
 
13. Given your goals, please indicate how often your 
organization engages in the following activities. [Indicate 
frequency: 1. very often; 2. often; 3. somewhat often; 4. 
somewhat rarely; 5. rarely;  6. very rarely, 7. the 
organization does not engage in such activity.] 
a. Participation in the work of government or 
parliament commissions and advisory 
committees 
b. Contact with civil servants or ministers 
c. Contacts with members of parliament 
d. Contacts with leaders of political parties 
e. Efforts to mobilize public opinion through 
disseminating information 
f. Organizing demonstrations, protests, strikes, or 
other direct actions 
g. Legal recourse to the courts or judicial bodies 
h. Contacts with people in the media 
i. Contacts with other voluntary organizations 
j. Organizing conferences and workshops for 
specialists in your field 
k. Organizing conferences and workshops for 
interested citizens or other non-specialists in your 
field 
l. Publishing newsletters, magazines, journals, 
monographs, or books 
m. Working for passage and implementation of 
needed legislation at local, regional and national 
level 
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n. Working to ensure the election of political leaders 
sympathetic to the goals of your organization 
o. Conducting or organizing research on the 
problems of your field 
p. Fund-raising 
q. Applying for grants 
r. Making efforts through mailings, personal 
contacts or other means to increase the 
membership of your organization 
s. Writing evaluations and reports for donors 
t. Building the identity of your members 
u. Other (please specify) 
14. How satisfied are you with the current 
government’s attitude towards civil society groups’ 
participation in policy making in Romania?  
1. Very satisfied 2. Satisfied   
3. Somewhat satisfied  4.Somewhat unsatisfied  
5. Unsatisfied   6.Very unsatisfied 
15. In the past five years, how has the participation of civil 
society in policy making changed?  
[Indicate dynamic: 1. Increased  2. Stayed the same,   
3. Decreased  4. Not sure] 
16. How important are the following 10 factors for your 
organization to influence official decision-makers 
about policy issues. [Please rank them in the order of 
their importance from 1 to 10: N.B. 1 means the most 
important and 10 means the least important] 
a. Personal links between people working in 
ministries and your organization 
b. Being part of an  advocacy coalition and tackling 
particular issues with a broad front  
c. The existence of institutionalized channels for the 
participation of civil society organizations in 
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policy-making 
d. Good connections and lobby to international 
organizations to put pressure on national decision-
makers 
e. Financial resources 
f. Mobilizing support from the media and public 
opinion 
g. Expertise on specific issues based on good 
research and knowledge of best practices 
h. Being part of a transnational network of 
organizations concerned about specific issues 
i. Good contacts with the leaders of political parties 
j. Number of members of an organization  
16.1 Please state if there are any other important factors 
than these and include them in your ranking. 
 
The following questions ask about your communication 
with other groups 
 
17. Do you work in coalition with other groups to promote 
particular policy proposals?  
If yes, why? 
18. In your opinion how effective is working with the 
existing political parties as a method for your group to use 
in promoting the policies your organization advocates? 
a. Very effective        c. Not very effective 
b. Somewhat effective       d. Hardly at all effective   
19. Usually how sympathetic are the following parties to 
the position of your group? [Please evaluate them: 1. 
Very sympathetic 2. Sympathetic 3. Somewhat 
sympathetic 4. Somewhat unsympathetic, 5. 
Unsympathetic 6. Very unsympathetic] 
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 a. PNL  b. PD  c. PRM 
 d. PSD  e. PUR  f. UDMR    
 g. Other (please specify) 
20. In the past five years, how have contacts between your 
group and the following organizations changed? 
[Indicate dynamic: 1. increased, 2. stayed the same, 3. 
decreased, 4. not sure.]  
a. Local newspapers g. Local administration 
b. Local radio stations h. National government 
c. Local TV stations i.  Political parties 
d. National newspapers j.  Other CSOs 
e. National radio stations   k. International organizations 
f. National TV stations l.  Transnational NGO networks 
    m. Other (Please specify) 
 
The following section asks questions about one particular 
case of civil society’s involvement in policy making: the 
passage and implementation of Law no. 544/2001 
regarding the free access to information of public interest 
in Romania [from now on will be refered as Freedom of 
Information Act, or briefly FOIA]. 
 
21 If your organization has participated in the coalition for 
Freedom of Information Act in Romania, please specify in 
which stage(s) of the policy process was your organization      
involved: designing the draft, adoption of the law, 
implementation of the law? 
22. What was the role of your organization in the coalition 
during this/these stage(s)? 
23. In general, how satisfied were you with the working of 
this coalition? 
 a. Very satisfied    
 c. Somewhat unsatisfied 
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 b. Satisfied     
 d. Unsatisfied 
 c. Somewhat satisfied     
 e. Very unsatisfied  
24. To what extent has the FOIA coalition mobilized 
support for your policy proposals from the  
following groups [Please evaluate: 1. Very strong 
support, 2. Strong support, 3. Moderate support, 4. 
Weak support, 5. Very weak support 6. No support at 
all]: 
a. Media      
 g. International organizations 
b. Public Opinion    
 h. Transnational NGO networks 
c. Universities     
 i. Government officials 
d. Intellectuals     
 j. Members of Parliament 
e. Grassroots organizations    
 k. Others (Please specify) 
f. Political Parties 
25. How effective were the following factors to influence 
the decision-makers and promote your  
own policy proposals regarding FOIA?  
[Please evaluate them: 1. Very effective; 2. Effective;   
3. Somewhat effective;  4. Somewhat ineffective;  
5. Ineffective; 6. Very ineffective; 7. Not applicable.] 
a. Participation in the work of government 
commissions and parliamentary committees 
b. Contact with civil servants, ministers, and 
members of parliament 
c. Contacts with leaders of political parties 
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d. Legal recourse to the courts or judicial bodies 
e. Contacts with people in the media 
f. Contacts with other voluntary organizations 
g. Personal links between people working in 
ministries and your organization 
h. Being part of an advocacy coalition and 
tackling particular issues with a broad front 
i. Lobby to international organizations to put 
pressure on national decision-makers 
j. Expertise on FOIA issues based on good 
research and knowledge of best practices 
k. Being part of a transnational network of 
organizations concerned about FOIA issues 
l. Other (please specify and rate) 
25.1 Please specify which three factors were the most 
effective and why.  
25.2 In your opinion, why were decision–makers more 
influenced by these three factors than by others? 
26. Has your organization or any of your coalition’s 
partners received any form of international support or 
financial and technical assistance aimed to help you in 
preparing and advocating your policy proposals for the 
design, adoption or implementation of the FOIA? [If yes, 
please specify.]  
 
In order to accomplish their goals many organizations 
receive financial grants or other forms of assistance. The 
following questions ask about your organization’s sources 
of income and support. 
 
27. In general, how has the budget of your organization 
changed over the past 3-5 years (if applicable)?  
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a. Increased  b. Decreased  c. Remained the same. 
28. Please write approximately what percent of your 
organization’s income comes from the following sources:  
a) Members contribution  
b) Romanian government and/or local public 
authorities  
c) International sources (including both private and 
public organizations, for example foreign 
governments and agencies, international 
foundations and NGOs, foreign businesses, etc.)  
d) Donations from Romanian private companies 
e) Fees for services provided by your organization 
f) Other sources (Please specify)  
29. If you have received foreign grants and subsidies, on 
average, how many different international sources provide 
your organization with funding annually? 
29.1. Which of these international-funding sources was the 
most important and approximately what percent of your 
organization’s total income came from this source in 
2004?  
Most important international source of funding: 
_______________________ 
a. Less than 20 percent   b.  20 – 40    
c.   40 – 60     d. 60 – 80 
e.  More than 80 percent. 
30. If you have received international assistance, how has 
this changed your organization’s capacity to advocate your 
policy proposals on different issues? [Please choose the 
answer that best represents your view] 
a. Significantly increased  
b. Increased 
c. Somewhat increased 
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d. No change 
e. Somewhat decreased 
f. Decreased 
g. Significantly decreased 
31. If you have received foreign grants and subsidies, 
please specify how often these grants have funded the 
following activities. [Indicate frequency: 1. very often; 2. 
often;  
3. somewhat often; 4. somewhat rarely; 5. rarely; 6. very 
rarely; 7. never.] 
a. Funding for travel abroad for conferences, 
training, workshops 
b. Funding for organizing domestic conferences, 
training, workshops 
c. Funding for salaries 
d. Funding for your organization’s newsletter 
e. Funding research necessary for different policy 
recommendations 
f. Funding for the advocacy of different ideas, 
projects and policies 
g. Funding for the monitoring of the 
implementation of different policies 
h. Funding for office equipment such as 
computers, fax machines, and photocopiers. 
i. Funding for books, literature   
j. Other activities (please specify) 
32. Given your organization’s goal, which three activities 
funded from international sources are the most important 
for your group? (Please explain why) 
33. Has your organization received international technical 
assistance in the form of training, advice, and information 
about: 
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a. organizational development and management 
b. advocacy methods 
c. fund raising 
d. issue analysis 
e. media relations 
f. other (please specify) 
34. Given the socioeconomic and political context in 
Romania, what are the main advantages of receiving 
international support for pursuing your organizational 
goal? 
35. Do you recall any situation when the reliance on 
international funding represented a weakness in pursuing 
the goals of you organization? (If yes please specify) 
36. Was there any area in which your organization wanted 
to work but could not because of a lack of international 
funding? (If yes, please specify) 
37. Have you received any international support for 
organizing advocacy coalition to tackle particular issues 
with a broad front? (If yes, please specify) 
 
 
38. Please write your name. __________ 
39. For how long have you been working in this 
organization? _____________ 
40. What is your position with this organization? 
______________ 
Date of completion: ____________ 
 
 
If there is something that is not covered in this 
questionnaire that you would like to add, explain, or 
discuss, please write below. 
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Thank you very much for filling out the questionnaire. 
Please return it by e-mail as soon as possible.  
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APPENDIX B - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
Ioana Avadani – Center for Independent Journalism, 
Executive-Director, (May 23, 2005) 
 
Emanuel Rauta – Romanian Academic Society, 
Publishing Manager/ Public Policy Analyst,   
(May 20, 2005) 
 
Adrian Sorescu – Pro Democracy Association, 
Executive-Director, (May 23, 2005) 
 
Oana Zabava – Transparency International – Romania, 
Executive-Director, (May 18, 2005)
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APPENDIX C - LIST OF DONOR 
ORGANIZATIONS IN ROMANIA 
 
 
Note: The list below is based on a review of the donor 
community in 2000 (see Porumb et. al 2000). It contains 
only the organization interviewed for that study, and 
therefore it might not be an exhaustive list of all donors 
active in Romania. However, it could be useful to provide 
an informative picture about the donor community in 
Romania.    
 
1. Allavida (formerly known as Charity Know How) 
2. America’s Development Foundation 
3. Carpathian Foundation 
4. Center for Legal Resources 
5. Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
6. Civil Society Development Foundation 
7. Community Mediation and Security Center 
8. Concept Foundation 
9. Co-operating Netherlands Foundations for Central and 
Eastern Europe 
10. Department for International Development (DFID) 
11. Ecumenical Association of Churches in Romania – 
AIDRom 
12. Embassy of Austria 
13. Embassy of Canada 
14. Embassy of Swiss 
15. Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
16. Ethnocultural Diversity Resource Center 
17. European Commission 
18. European Cultural Foundation 
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19. Eurotin 
20. German Marshall Fund of the United States 
21. King Baudouin Foundation 
22. Open Society Foundation 
23. Princess Margarita Foundation 
24. Regional Environmental Center 
25. Resource Center for Roma Communities 
26. Romanian Environmental Partnership Foundation 
27. Romanian Social Development Fund 
28. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
29. United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) 
30. World Bank 
31. World Learning Inc. 
32. World Vision 
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